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" Speech concerning public officials is more than self expression; it is the 
essence of self-government." 
Justice William BrennanO 
Ah, freedom of speech, the bastion of democracy. "Give me the liberty 
to know, to utter, and to argue according to conscience," cried Milton, 
"above all liberties." The right to freedom of expression is enshrined in 
international law; 1 it is a cornerstone of the Constitutions of many of the 
countries of the world; it has been included in New Zealand's Bill of 
Rights;2 it pervades judicial and political discourse; it is part of the 
language of ordinary people. "It's a free country," is the catch-cry, "I 
can say what I like." 
Nowhere is this right more important than in the political arena. The 
right to comment on the character, actions and policies of public 
officials3, and to criticise and cajole them, is fundamental to democratic 
society. 
Many would be surprised to learn, then, that the right to freedom of 
speech does not exist as such in the common law. Although it has 
recently been accorded a measure of statutory recognition in the Bill of 
Rights, for hundreds of years it only existed as a common law freedom 
"in the gaps" of the law , that is, where judges and legislators have not 
seen fit to restrict it in some way. 
One reason for restricting freedom of speech is the protection of 
reputation and honour against unjustified attack. The law recognises that 
name-calling can hurt as much as sticks and stones. Defamatory slurs 
can foster hatred and ridicule and deal cruel blows to self-respect, 
personal and professional relationships and the esteem in which a person 
is held in the community. 
The law of defamation protects people against untrue statements to their 
discredit. It protects everybody equally. Politicians and departmental 
heads have the same rights to sue for defamation as accountants, street-
sweepers and publicans. But public officials sue much more frequently 
than do other New Zealanders.4 Perhaps this is not surprising: they are 
frequently in the public spotlight and they are often involved in the 
resolution of important and contentious issues. Further, their careers 
depend on their reputations. They are naturally concerned to ensure that 
these are not unfairly tarnished. 
0 Garrison v Louisi.ana 379 US 64 (1967),74-75. 
1 See, for example, the International Declaration of Human Rights UN Doc N810, 71, 
Article 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171, Article 
19; and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 
UNTS 221, Article 10. 
2 Bill of Rights Act l 990, s 14 (see below o 46). 
3 For convenience, the term "public official" will be used in this paper to refer to public 
officials elected and appointed - that is, politicians and government officials. 
4 See below n 54. 
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Where does this leave our cherished freedom of speech, particularly 
political speech? Just how big are the gaps in the common law in which 
the right to speak resides? 
Are they large enough to permit a newspaper to respond to as accusation 
made in Parliament by the shadow Minister of Justice that its campaign 
seeking harsher penalties for violent criminals was "more concerned 
with profits than with morals" by pointing out that the shadow Minister, 
as a noted Auckland lawyer, might himself have been concerned with 
personal profit because he stood to gain from policies which did not 
deter crime?5 
Would these gaps allow a newspaper to publish a letter from a ratepayer 
attacking a Council decision to approve its President's application to 
convert his backyard garage into servants' quarters - when the Council 
had for years enforced a policy against people living in garages?6 
Do these gaps provide enough room for a candidate in a general election 
to describe the leader of a national political party and candidate for 
Prime Minister as " ... a man who despises many people ... bureaucrats, 
civil servants, politicians, women, jews and professionals."?7 
Could a newspaper rely on these gaps to quote an importer on the subject 
of import licences as saying "See Phil [the Minister for granting 
licences] and Phil would fix it" and calling for an inquiry into import 
licensing procedure?8 
Are these gaps big enough to allow television journalists to ask, in a 
melodramatic and rather biased way, whether the government's close 
relationship with big business interests is "for the public good"? 
In each of these cases, proceedings were issued for defamation. Legal 
costs have ensured that even in the one case that was settled, the speech 
was far from free. The other cases were won by the plaintiffs except for 
the final example, which has not yet reached trial. It concerns a 
"Frontline" programme that screened on Television New Zealand last 
year, and produced writs totalling almost $7 million.9 
The implications for political speech are grim. "Publish and be damned" 
has changed from a defiant exhortation into a legal prognosis. Most 
news organisations in New Zealand (and most private individuals as 
well) cannot afford to be damned. Material which is in the in the public 
5 News Media Ownership v Finlay [1970) 1 NZLR 1089. 
6 Jones v Skelton [1963] lWLR 1362. 
7 The case was settled but not before the Court of Appeal bad ruled out the defences of 
fair comment and qualified privilege and restricted the defendant's ability to plead 
justification: see Templeton v Jones [1984) 1 NZLR 448. 
8 Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway [1960) 1 WLR 997. 
9 The plaintiffs are David Lange ($1 million), Sir Roger Douglas ($2 million), Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer ($1.5 million), Sir Robert Jones ($1.3 million) and Ricbard Prebble 
($1.15 million). 
interest is left unpublished. We must ask ourselves whether these are the 
sorts of things we want to go unsaid. 
The law of defamation has been much criticised in recent times. 10 At a 
fundamental level it is often said to be overly restrictive of free speech. 
At a procedural level it is seen as unduly complex and technical . In the 
1970's it was the subject of reviews by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission11 and government-appointed committees in Britainl2 and 
New Zealand _13 The McKay Committee made a series of 
recommendations - substantive and procedural - for the improvement of 
the law. The most important was its suggestion that a special defence of 
qualified privilege be enacted for the media. Its report has borne fruit in 
the form of a Defamation Bill, which was introduced to Parliament in 
August 1988. However, that Bill does not contain the recommended 
defence for the media. It was referred to the Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee which considered 28 submissions. The Bill has since 
been reported back, in a slightly amended form, to the House. Its 
legislative future is uncertain. 
Although the literature is voluminous, little attention has been paid, 
except in a general way, to what might be called the distinction between 
public and private speech. 14 "Public speech" refers to comments and 
assertions about the behaviour, character and policies of those whose 
behaviour, character and policies are of particular public concern, most 
especially public officials. In this paper it will be suggested that this sort 
of speech is of a special character. It is more in1portant to society than 
other types of speech and deserves extra protection under the law. This 
will be referred to as the "principle of free political speech". 
In this paper I will 
(i) discuss the recent Frontline programme "For the Public Good" which 
again raises the issues surrounding freedom of speech in the political 
context, and consider the political and administrative response; 
10 See, for example, J Burrows "Defamation - the Need for Reform" in Conference 
Papers NZ Law Conference (Trilogy Business Systems, 1987), 129; G Palmer 
"Defamation - An Overview" in Media Law (Legal Research Foundation Seminar, 
1988), 7; J McKay "Defamation - A Statutory Defence for the Media?" Unpublished 
Legal Writing Requirement Victoria University of Wellington 1985; T Goddard "You 
Mean I Can't Run That?" in Conference Papers NZ Law Conference (Trilogy 
Business Systems, 1987) 124; and N Strossen "Proposed Reforms of Defamation Law" 
in Conference Papers NZ Law Conference (Trilogy Business Systems, 1987) 121. 
l l Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy Australian Law Reform Commission 
Report No 11 1979. 
12 Faulks Committee - Report of the Committee on Defamation (1975; Cmnd 5909). 
13 Recommendations on the Law of Defamation Report of the Committee on 
Defamation (December 1977). 
14 The only New Zealand writers to have considered the distinction in any detail are 
Professor Palmer ("Politics and Defamation - A Case of Kiwi Humbug?" [1972] NZLJ 
265) and Greg Lisk ("Defamation and its Effect on Freedom of Speech" Unpublished 
Dissertation, Auckland University 1974). 
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(ii) examine, in the context of the Frontline allegations, New Zealand's 
current defamation law, with a view to finding out what exactly it allows 
us to say, and what hurdles and traps exist for the unwary political 
commentator; 
(iii) put the case for change, concluding that the present law does not 
offer enough protection to political comment; 
(iv) outline the position in the United States where the speech of those 
commenting on public figures is given Constitutional protection, and 
look at the problems that have arisen there; 
(v) analyse the statutory defence for the media recommended by the 
McKay Committee and suggest that its enactment would redress many of 
the problems raised in part (iii) without reproducing the problems 
inherent in the United States' solution; 
(vi) evaluate the provisions of the Defamation Bill in the light of the free 
political speech principle and discuss the reasons given in Parliament for 
the rejection of the McKay defence; and 
(vii) speculate on the likely impact of the Bill of Rights in this area. 
PART 1. THE FRONTLINE PROGRAMME 
At the end of April in 1990, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) broadcast 
a documentary called "For the Public Good" on its regular Frontline 
programme. To the accompaniment of evocative music and using slick 
graphics, spy-camera footage and sinister reconstructions, it raised 
questions about the links between the Labour government and big 
business interests.15 Were these dealings, Frontline asked, really for the 
public good? 
There was an immediate political uproar over the programme.16 TVNZ 
received eight formal complaints which it passed on to its Complaints 
15 It revealed that Cabinet Ministers David Lange and Sir Roger Douglas were 
beneficiaries under trusts operated by businessman Sir Frank Renouf. It showed 
footage of Ministerial dinners with business leaders at Vogel House. It contrasted the 
substantial campaign contributions given by business leaders to the Labour Party -
some received directly by Douglas - with the "good honest money" gathered during the 
New Labour Party's fundraising. It examined the asset sales made and the knighthoods 
given to those same business leaders. It alleged that former State-Owned Enterprises 
Minister Richard Prebble deleted records concerning the government's asset-sales 
process after his demotion from Cabinet. It also suggested that the Labour Party's 
National Executive Committee discussed settling its $300 OOO campaign debt to its 
advertising agency, Colenso Communications Ltd, by the award of government 
contracts. 
16 Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer described it as "all sleaze and innuendo" 
(Dominion Wellington, New Zealand, 30 April), and "grossly misleading, biased and 
unbalanced" New Zealand Herald Auckland, 30 April). Deputy Opposition leader Don 
McKionon called for a Commission oflnquiry into the programme's allegations. 
TVNZ chief executive Julian Mounter sought a full report on the progran1me. 
Opposition MP John Banks even asked the Auditor-General to investigate. 
Committee as required under section 6 of the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
Five of these complaints were upheld, at least in part.17 The Committee 
found that the programme breached the Broadcasting Act and the 
Television Programme Standards in ten respects. It agreed that parts of 
the programme were inaccurate, unfair and lacked objectivity. Other 
parts were found to be "imprudent" but did not breach broadcasting 
standards. 
On the recommendation of the Committee, TVNZ broadcast on its June 
10 edition of Frontline a summary of the Committee's conclusions, an 
apology and brief statements from three of the successful complainants. 
The Prime Minister refused the offer of a right of reply, objecting to 
Frontline' s editorial control over the reply and questioning the fairness 
and independence of the complaints process. 
The members of the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR), some 
Treasury officials and several politicians were still unsatisfied. They 
referred their complaints to the Broadcasting Standards Authority for 
investigation and review under section 8(a) of the Broadcasting Act. On 
December 14 the Authority issued its decision on the NZBR and 
Treasury complaints.1 8 It found that TVNZ's Complaints Committee 
had not gone far enough and upheld several specific complaints of 
inaccuracy and bias.19 
The Authority concluded that TVNZ's apology programme was 
inadequate and ordered that TVNZ broadcast a correction and apology at 
peak viewing time summarising the Authority's decision and explaining 
that by way of punishment it had been ordered to refrain from 
broadcasting advertisements from 6 pm until closedown on Sunday 
February 3 1991. 
As a result, TVNZ was held to account for its departures from accepted 
professional standards. A right of reply was offered. Two apologies 
were made. TVNZ suffered the indignity of explaining its lapses on 
prime-time television. It was punished financially .20 
l 7 Press Release by Julian Mounter, June l 1990. 
l8 Re New Zealand Business Roundtable Decision 26/90 [1991] NZAR 63. 
l9 The Authority held that TVNZ bad descended into the realm of advocacy 
journalism. It had conveyed the impression that the NZBR was buying specific policies 
from politicians and engaging in covert action to subvert democratic government and 
that certain business interests were given preferential treatment in the asset sales. Thus 
TVNZ breached its fundamental obligation "to be truthful and accurate on points of 
fact" (Television Programme Standards, Standard 1). It held that TVNZ also breached 
its duty "to show balance, impartiality and fairness in dealing with political matters, 
current affairs and all questions of a controversial matter" (Standard 6) in that it 
"displayed a bias against sectors of New Zealand business and the NZBR in particular" 
and failed to provide NZBR officials with "an opportunity to comment upon the 
statements and messages about the NZBR's ideological stance and the process by 
which members purchased state assets ... "(above 1118, 90, 92). 
20 It is unclear precisely how much it cost TVNZ in foregone advertising revenue. 
However, all of the estimates I have seen exceed by a large margin the maximum fine 
for which TVNZ would be liable for non-compliance! In any case, it is submitted that 
this is an odd sort of punishment and one which seems to be directed as much at the 
5 
In short, the NZBR has had its pound of flesh. Its reputation has been 
salved. Several important question arise: Do these administrative 
remedies not provide sufficient protection for reputations and 
punishment for violations of them? Is it appropriate that TVNZ may be 
civilly liable for monetary compensation as well, particularly in the 
political field where (as I will argue later) there should be a greater 
degree of tolerance?21 More importantly, should there be extra 
constraints on political journalistic speech beyond those of professional 
ethics and responsibility? It is submitted that there is much to be said 
for the system utilised by the Press Council which requires complainants 
to sign an undertaking not to sue before it agrees to pursue a complaint. 
Perhaps if the codes of practice had been more carefully adhered to, the 
defamatory slurs could have been avoided. As I will demonstrate in Part 
2, however, that is by no means certain. Just how much of a constraint 
on political speech are New Zealand's laws of defamation? 
PART 2. DEFAMATION LAW AND THE FRONTLINE 
PROGRAMME 
In this Part I will examine the legal rules of defamation and the operation 
of the legal system in which they are applied to find out what we can and 
cannot say under the law, particularly with reference to politicians and 
public officials. 
The laws of defamation constrain speech in two ways. First, the legal 
rules themselves, even when considered in a theoretical vacuum, do not 
corn prehensively protect political speech. Secondly, additional 
constraints on speech arise out of the processes of the law: the rules of 
pleading, the allocation of burdens of proof, the use of a jury as fact-
finder and so forth. 
Consider the Frontline case. TVNZ journalists uncovered information 
about the existence of share portfolios held in trust for leading 
politicians. They found out that Cabinet Ministers personally accepted 
huge political donations in private. They had listened to the claims of 
former members of the governing party's Executive Council that the 
Council discussed the possibility of awarding government contracts to 
the party's advertising agency to settle campaign debts. It was an 
election year and they believed that the public should be given this 
information. It raised important issues regarding the propriety of our 
politicians' behaviour, the funding of political parties, the openness of 
advertisers. Would not an orclinary fine be preferable? Part of the money could 
perhaps be awarded to the victim or paid into a trust fund to promote the ethical 
training of journalists. 
21 In the words of Geoffrey Robertson, QC, the award of massive libel damages is 
"hardly a rational way of rectifying media misconduct. It is a way as open to all as the 
Ritz Hotel, it chills publication - especially by uninsured journals - it takes several years 
before judgment is in, and it is starting to make the temple of law resemble a casino." 
("Media Standards: The Common Law and the Communications Revolution" 
Unpublished speech from the Commonwealth Law Conference, 1990, 28). 
democracy in New Zealand, the possibility of corporate capture of 
government and the accountability of our leaders. 
Could they have presented this material so as to raise these issues and yet 
avoid liability for defan1ation? What sort of problems do journalists 
reporting on this sort of information face? How much can safely be 
said? 
A .. Constraints Imposed by Law 
1. Defamatory meaning 
As a matter of law, a statement which defames a person to a third party 
is actionable. A defamatory statement is one that tends to lower a person 
in the eyes of right-thinking members of society generally or exposes 
that person to hatred, ridicule or contempt, or causes her or him to be 
shunned or avoided .22 
The test is very wide. Publishers must tread very carefully. Questioning 
a person's integrity or propriety will usually injure his or her reputation. 
Criticism that is exaggerated may be held to be defamatory ,23 and the 
publication of suspicions can also found an action for defamation if it is 
implied that the plaintiff has created grounds for those suspicions.24 The 
mere publication of a plaintiff's denials of allegations may produce 
'smoke' that suggests the existence of 'fire' to ordinary readers.25 Thus, 
even if rights of reply had been given in the Frontline programme, the 
very act of putting the allegations could be held to be defamatory! 
With respect to the Colenso allegations, TVNZ was simply broadcasting 
a statement made by someone else . The editing may have been 
scrupulously fair and accurate. But that does not make a difference. All 
who publish a defamatory statement are liable for it.26 
Moreover, the reporters must be very wary of the different meanings 
which can be placed on their words. Meanings are not confined to those 
apparent on the face of the words. The story must be scrntinised very 
carefully for defamatory inferences or innuendo - where the matter is 
defamatory if read in the light of other information known to the readers. 
The bottom line is that it would have been very difficult for TVNZ' s 
reporters to frame their story in such a way as to avoid any defamatory 
"stings" (harmful meanings) against the political figures they were 
writing about. The very essence of the story is the suggestion that the 
politicians' behaviour was naive and even unethical. It would have 
been almost impossible to avoid conveying to ordinary viewers the 
implication that something more insidious might have been going on 
22 Parminter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105; Simm v Stretch (1936) 52 11..R 669; 80 
SJ 669 (fil). 
23 McConnick v Bennison (1938) 82 Sol Jo 869. 
24 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234. 
25 Truth (NZ) Ltd v Bowles [1966] NZLR 303. 
26 R v Paine (1696) Mod Rep 163. 
beneath the secrecy. To criticise dealings for their lack of transparency 
and accountability is implicitly to point out the potential for those 
involved to abuse their position. 
However, statements with defamatory meanings are not all tortious. 
There are several defences. If the statement published is true, or 
constitutes fair comment on a matter of public interest or is made on a 
privileged occasion, the publisher will escape liability.27 Unfortunately 
these defences are not as comprehensive as they may seem. 
2. Justification 
The defence of justification protects statements whose sting is true or 
substantially true.28 That does not mean that the whole item needs to be 
completely accurate. 
Since the reporters were planning to make several allegations, they 
needed to be prepared to prove each one of them independently, even 
though they were partly interrelated. This is because a plaintiff can pick 
out one allegation and sue only in respect of that. In such cases the 
publisher cannot prove the truth of the article ta.ken as a whole.29 So, for 
example, if a businessman was to allege that the programme implied that 
his knighthood arose from his improper relationship with the 
government, then TVNZ could not prove the Ministerial business 
dinners, the asset sales and the secret donations to justify that inference. 
3. Fair Comment 
This defence is very important, especially in the political context. Lord 
Denning called it "one of the essential elements that go to make up our 
freedom of speech".30 If this defence encapsulates our right to free 
speech, then any shortcomings it has should be a major source of 
concern. In fact, the shield of fair comment has been battered and holed 
in its many tussles with reputation. 
Anyone seeking to rely on this defence must bear in mind five things: 
(i) The statement must be recognisable as comment. It cannot be an 
allegation of fact, although inferences of fact are capable of being 
regarded as comment as long as the reasoning process is clearly set 
27 A fourth defence, unintentional defamation, is contained in s 6 of the Defamation 
Act 1954. It provides a defence to a publisher who unwittingly and non-negligently 
defames a person if an offer is made to publish a suitable correction and apology. 
28 Under section 7 of the Defamation Act " ... a defence of justification shall not fail by 
reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be 
true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the 
remaining charges." However, great care still needed to be taken with the accuracy of 
the assertions in the programme. It may be rare for detail to be truly in1material. 
29 Templeton v Jones, above n 7. 
30 Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] QB 157,170. 
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out.3 1 This means that TVNZ's journalists had to take care not to 
intermingle facts and opinions so that they could not be told apart. 
The problem is that often the material may be presented as either a fact 
or a comment. For example, the unsupported assertion that certain 
government figures had entered into dangerously close relationships with 
businesspeople might well be construed as an allegation of fact. To be 
protected as fair comment it must clearly be an expression of opinion. 
The facts upon which the comment is based should ideally have been set 
out earlier in the story.32 
(ii) The comment must be based on a factual substratum.33 These facts 
must be set out in the publication or referred to with sufficient clarity. 
Under section 8 of the Defamation Act, however, the defence of fair 
comment "shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation 
of fact is not proved if the expression is fair comment having regard to 
such of the facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as are 
true." The liberalising effect of this provision may be largely illusory. 
There is nothing to stop the plaintiff complaining of part of the material 
only, so that the publisher cannot rely on statements of fact in the rest of 
the material because they are not contained "in the words complained 
of." 
Even though the Frontlin e journalists were clearly working with a 
factual substratum, it is equally clear that they had to take great care with 
their phrasing and make sure they anchored comments securely to the 
facts . 
(iii) The comment must be fair. This means that it must be a view that a 
person, however prejudiced, might honestly hold on the facts.34 The test 
is much harsher where corrupt or dishonest motives are imputed. In such 
a case, the opinion must be a conclusion which ought to be drawn from 
the facts,35 a requirement which approaches the stringency of the 
defence of justification. 
The distinction between comments that impute corruption and those that 
merely suggest that particular behaviour (such as the personal receipt of 
enormous political donations) though not necessarily actually improper, 
3l 0 ' Brien v Marquis of Salisbury (1889) 54 JP 215. 
32 Their approach had to be of the form: 
David Lange and Roger Douglas were beneficiaries under trusts operated by 
businessman Sir Frank Renouf. The trusts were funded by the politicians and contained 
thousands of dollars worth of shares. Politicians have great power to regulate and 
influence the economy and the share market. Their first duty must be to the public. 
These trusts create a conflict of interest. Moreover their secrecy gives rise to 
opportunities for abuse. Justice is not seen to be being done. Their involvement in this 
sort of arrangement should be forbidden; at the very least these interests ought to be 
disclosed to the public. 
33 Kemsly v Foot [1951] 2 KB 34. 
34 Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275. 
35 Dakhyl v Labouchere [1908] 2 KB 325. See also Campbell v Spottiswoode (1863) 3 
B &S 769. 
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is undesirable because there are no checks on it, is crucial. There is a 
very fine line here as we have seen. As a consequence, journalists 
questioning the integrity of a particular political figure (as the Frontline 
reporters virtually had to do in order to raise the sorts of issues they 
wanted to talk about) would be well advised to ensure that they can 
prove the truth of the most extreme interpretation their words are capable 
of bearing or else refrain from publishing such allegations. 
(iv) The comment must be on a matter of public interest. That does not 
mean a statement will be protected as long as the public find it 
interesting. It must relate to a matter of public concern and 
importance.36 Comment on the competence and public behaviour of 
public representatives and officials clearly satisfies this requirement. 
(v) The defence is defeated if the publication of the article is motivated 
by spite or ill-will. The mere existence of bad feelings between the 
defamer and the defamed person does not in law amount to malice. As 
long as the dominant reason for publication is the furtherance of the 
public interest, then in law they are not acting maliciously.37 
This defence is what protects the speech of a host of people: political 
commentators, columnists, editorial-writers, participants in talk-back 
shows and politicians making speeches outside the House, and lecturers -
right through to people writing letters to the editor or discussing the 
news over a cup of coffee. In light of the stringent requirements that the 
comment be separated from - and based upon - facts and that it be "fair", 
it is sobering to reflect on the prospects for these sorts of speech were 
they to come before the courts ... 
4. Privilege 
False and defamatory statements which cannot be defended as fair 
comment nevertheless receive protection of they are made on a 
privileged occasion.38 
Two types of privilege are relevant to the media. One is statutory 
qualified privilege. It permits fair and accurate reports of certain listed 
proceedings, documents and statements.39 
36 London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375. 
37 This is not necessarily the way juries see things! See below Part 2B. 
38 See generally, J Burrows News Media Law in New Zealand (3ed Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 55-82; P Lewis Gatley on Libel and Slander (8ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1981) paras 381-690. 
39 If the report concerns proceedings in Parliament or in court, it is protected by 
privilege providing it is not made maliciously (Defamation Act sl9 and 1st Schedule 
Part 1). The other matters protected under the Defamation Act include fair and 
accurate reports of the proceedings of government inquiries, certain public meetings, 
local authority meetings, foreign legislatures and courts; and the contents of 
government statements and public registers (1st Schedule Part 2). These reports are 
given more limited protection. Not only must they be made without malice, the matter 
must be one of public concern and its publication for the public benefit. Furthermore, 
the publisher must, at the request of a complainant, publish "a reasonable letter or 
statement by way of explanation or contradiction" in order to make use of the defence 
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The second type of privilege is the common law defence of qualified 
privilege. This protects statements made in the performance of a legal, 
social or moral duty to people with a corresponding interest or duty to 
receive them.40 It also covers statements made in furtherance of a lawful 
interest shared by the speaker and the listener.41 At first blush these 
principles seem wide enough to protect the media when it is making 
statements and comments about very important things like Ministers' 
financial assets, their links with big business and the funding of political 
parties. The media can be said to have a social duty to publish these 
facts and the public has a corresponding interest in receiving them, 
particularly in an election year. 
Indeed, it seems that stories about the behaviour and fitness for public 
office of candidates for upcoming elections may well attract privilege 
providing the publication is restricted, as far as is reasonably possible, to 
constituents.42 Some Judges would go further. In M cSweeney v 
Berryman, Barker J observed that "[t]he authorities may well recognise 
that the publication of defamatory material in a newspaper may be 
privileged where the matter published is of general interest and it is the 
duty of the publisher to communicate the information to the general 
public. "43 
One case, however, has stood as an obstacle to those wishing to develop 
a form of public interest privilege for the media. In Holloway v Truth, it 
was held in the Court of Appeal that44 
there is no principle of law which may be invoked in support of the contention 
the a newspaper can claim privilege if it publishes a defamatory statement of 
fact about an individual merely because the general topic developed in the 
article is a matter of public interest. 
Might the Frontline allegations be accorded p1ivilege? The McSweeney 
and O'Brien dicta might suggest so. Holloway would indicate 
otherwise. In the words of Cooke J, as he then was, in Templeton's case, 
"the present law regarding qualified privilege is probably not wholly 
logical..."45. He concluded that change may be desirable, but must be 
left to Parliamenr.46 
(s 19(2)). These defences facilitate the dissemination of important official information 
but the protection may be lost if the report is malicious, inaccurate or incomplete, or if 
the heading is not a fair summary of the report. What is more, they do not protect 
comment on that information. 
40 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309. 
41 Turner v Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Pictures Ltd [1950] WN 83; 1 All ER 449. 
42 See Lucas & Son (Nelson Mail) v O'Brien [1978] 2 NZLR 289, 296 where 
Richmond P held that the crucial question was whether the "allegations ... were of 
sufficient public importance to give rise to a social or moral duty to publish them in a 
newspaper." See also Templeton v Jones, above n 7,459. 
43 [1980] NZLR 168, 176. 
44 [1960] NZLR 69. 
45 Templeton v Jones, above n 7,458. 
46 It is worth wondering what impact section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which 
states that "[e]veryone has a right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to 
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B. Additional Constraints Arising Through the Operation and 
Application of the Law 
The width of the definition of defamation and the narrowness and 
uncertainty of the defences available against a defamation action are not 
the only problems faced by those who seek to comment on the fault and 
misconduct of political representatives and officials. Far from it. The 
processes of the law and the way it is applied in practice create huge 
hurdles even for those who are convinced that their utterances fall within 
the law. 
It is one thing to be certain that a particular defence is available in 
theory. It is quite another to establish it in court. For one thing the 
burdens of proof in relation to the defences rest with the defendant. 
Plaintiffs need only prove that a defamatory statement was published, 
and that i.t referred to them. Plaintiffs who intend to argue malice need 
to prove that as well. They need not, however, prove that the statements 
were false, that the defendants were at fault or that any damage was 
suffered. 
A defendant who contends that a statement was true must prove it. That 
can be devilishly difficult. She or he may be hampered by difficulties in 
compiling evidence (particularly if the plaintiff waits a while before 
bringing suit); by the rules of evidence (whichi may debar logically 
relevant material); and by ethical problems (if sources must be revealed). 
Moreover there is always the possibility that the fact-finder - be it a 
judge or a jury - will simply get it wrong.47 
The frequent use of juries in defamation trials exacerbates these 
problems and creates new ones particularly with respect to the defence 
of fair comment. It is the jury's role to decide, amongst other things, 
whether the meaning of the material is defamatory, whether it consists of 
comment, whether that comment is "fair" and whether the statement was 
malicious. The Judge must rule whether the evidence is capable of 
supporting such findings. She or he makes such rulings in the presence 
of the jury. It is often suggested that this process must be very confusing 
for jury members.48 
seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form", will have 
on the courts' reluctance to develop a public interest privilege. Note that, depending on 
bow it is iriterpreted, the Bill of Rights may do much more than offer guidance to the 
courts in their development of the common law. The whole of the common law may 
have to be measured against its standards. See Part 7 below. · 
47 Defendants face a further difficulty when pleading justification. They are stuck with 
the sting pleaded by the plaintiff, that is, they may address arguments only to the 
meanings a,lleged by the plaintiff. Of course, they can argue that the words complained 
of do not bear those meanings, but they cannot plead that the sting was different - for 
example, wider or less severe - and try to justify that sting instead (see Templeton v 
Jones, above n 7; BNZ v Crush (1988] 2 NZLR 234). 1 
48 For example, a juror who bears a judge say that the statement complained of is 
capable of tending to lower the plaintiff in the minds of right-thinking people could be 
forgiven for thinking that the question of whether the statement actually tends to lower 
the plaintiff in the eyes of right-thinking people has already been decided. 
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What is more, jury members may apply the ordinary meanings of "fair" 
and "malice" when considering these issues and conclude that to be 
"fair" a comment must be unbiased and warranted on the facts, and that 
a person who dislikes another and subsequently defames him or her is, 
with no further evidence, acting maliciously. Juries might also be biased 
against media defendants, and are wont to be swayed by the rhetoric or 
charisma of the parties. 
Even where, despite these hurdles, a defence can be made out in court 
legal costs can be enormous. The archaic intricacies of the law of 
defamation and rules of pleading mean that both parties are forced to 
retain expert counsel. Delays are frequent. It is not unknown for cases 
to take five years to be resolved.49 Costs may be awarded against the 
plaintiff but these may not amount to more than a token contribution 
toward the total legal bill. Nor can they compensate for the other costs 
of litigation - months or years of acrimony, frustration and diversion 
from other much-preferred activities. 
Of course, if the defendant cannot make out a defence the costs will be 
much higher because they will include a bill for damages. These are 
determined by the jury which has little to go on, except the plaintiff's 
often exorbitant claim and perhaps a vague recollection of the huge 
awards made by overseas juries in resent defamation cases.SO 
Professor Burrows describes damages awards in defamation cases as 
arbitrary and disproportionately high and suggests that they often go-well 
beyond the compensation of the plaintiff.51 There is often an element of 
'teaching the media a lesson', even where no exemplary damages are 
awarded. 
Plaintiffs are well aware of these problems. They are able to exploit 
them by issuing "gagging writs" for exorbitant amounts of damages for 
the purpose of stifling debate. They often have no intention of 
proceeding to trial. Comments Professor Palmer: "[m]entioning large 
sums of money, in some cases an astronomical sum, scares quite rigid 
those who don't know the law".52 Indeed even those who are well 
versed in the law might be forgiven a shiver of fright!53 
49 eg Jones v Skelton, above n 6. For a discussion of the intricacies of the law and the 
rules of pleading in defamation, see J Miles "Tactics and Pleadings in Defamation" in 
Media Law (Legal Research Foundation Seminar, 1988), 55. 
50 Professor Burrows (above n 38, 48) sets out the New Zealand dollar equivalents of 
several recent libel awards in Britain: Jeffrey Archer - $1.3 million; Elton John - $2.73 
million; Baron Aldington - $4 million. 
5l Above n 38, 47. He believes that this is a dangerous practice because it in turn 
inflates the level of exemplary damages in cases where these are awanied. 
52 "Gagging Writs Under Fire"New Zealand Times 8 June 1986. 
53 Some writers believe that the problem of gagging writs is largely mythical. 
Barrister Tom Goddard points to the McKay Committee survey which revealed that an 
average of only one action a year was threatened against each media respondent 
between 1970 and 1974 and that when total damages awarded in court over that period 
are averaged out across threatened actions, each threat only cost the media a little over 
$700 (T Goddard "Defamation: The Committee Reports" [1978) NZU 96. And see 
the McKay Report, above n 13, 133-140). 
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The problems are worse in the political context where the public figures 
involved tend to be relatively wealthy, legally streetwise and much more 
likely than most to sue to uphold their reputations.54 
We can at least derive a modicum of comfort from the right of a 
publisher, at the end of the day, to "publish and be damned" if the 
material is deemed important enough. Or can we? It seems that even 
this right is being eroded. A plaintiff who gets wind of a forthcoming 
publication and who suspects it may contain defamatory material may 
seek an interim injunction to prevent publication. Such applications are 
becoming increasingly frequent, and are all too often successful, despite 
apparently stringent legal safeguards.55 Somehow the slogan "try to 
publish and be enjoined" does not have the same ring to it! 
In sum, not only are there gaps in our legal "rights" to speak freely, we 
face an uphill battle to establish those we do have. This puts Frontline' s 
editorial staff (who must decide whether or not to air a particular 
programme) in a quandry. Even if all reasonable care had been taken 
with the facts and phrasing (though it must be admitted that such care 
was not taken) the material may well still have been defamatory. Editors 
must make such decisions every day in relation to everything from an 
angry letter to the editor to a pointed political cartoon. "Strange!" said 
Benjamin Franklin, "that a man who has wit enough to write a satire 
should have folly enough to publish it."56 
The fact remains, however, that a news organisation does not make its publishing 
decisions on the basis of average outcomes but rather on the basis of the writ or threat 
of one that sits on the desk with a lot of zeroes after the figure claimed. It is significant 
that only 2% of the threatened actions mentioned in the McKay survey actually went to 
trial. A further 6% were settled. Even as a proportion of cases commenced, the 
number of cases which made it to court is very small: only 10%. It is likely that a 
similar pattern will apply to the $25 million worth of defamation writs filed against 
media defendants in the Wellington High Court between 1975 and 1985 (Christchurch 
Star 27 August 1986). 
The Australian Law Reform Commission also found evidence that made it certain that 
"many actions are commenced purely to deter further publication of material critical of 
the plaintiff' (above oll, para 53). The tactic works, so the Commission believed, 
because of confusion about the law of contempt of court and fear of providing evidence 
of malice. 
54 Former Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon has been involved in 18 defamation 
cases and has won 15 of them (Evidence of the Right Honorable Sir Robert Muldoon 
Submission to the Select Committee JL/89/426 2, 1). A study conducted in 1979 
revealed that almost 30% of all plaintiffs in all defamation cases in New Zealand and 
Australia between 1969 and 1978 were politicians or government officials or candidates 
for those positions (G Palmer "Defamation Law Down Under" 64 Iowa LR (1979), 
1215.) More recent figures show that eight politicians filed defamation writs between 
1975 and 1985 in the Wellington High Court alone (Statistics compiled by the BCNZ: 
see BCNZ Submission to the Select Committee on the Defamation Bill JL/189/441 
14A). 
55 See T Goddard "You Mean I Can't Run That?" in Conference Papers New Zealand 
Law Conference (Trilogy Business Systems 1987), 124. 
56 Note that the present laws and their application do not entirely meet the needs of 
plaintiffs either. They too are affected by the uncertainty, length and expense of the 
proceedings. The law provides no mechanism for the achievement of what in many 
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PART 3. THE CASE FOR CHANGE 
In this part of the paper I will argue that as a matter of policy political 
speech ought to be accorded better protection under the law. That is, the 
importance of full and frank debate and robust criticism of policies and 
personalities in the political arena is such that any interference with such 
speech requires greater justification than interference with speech 
concerning more mundane affairs such as the performance of the All 
Blacks or the love life of a movie star. This I have denoted the principle 
of free political speech. 
Why does political speech deserve special treatment under the law? The 
answers are many. They range from the democratic importance of 
speech relating to public officials57 to New Zealand's obligations under 
international law. 
A. The Importance of Political Speech in a Democracy 
Frederick Shauer defines democracy as58 
a system that acknowledges that the ultimate power resides in the population at 
large, that the people as a body are sovereign, and that they, either directly or 
cases will be the best solution - a prompt retraction and apology - except, ironically, 
insofar as its complexities encourage early settlement. Success in a defamation case -
which may receive little publicity - several years after the defamatory statement is made 
is hardly a ringing vindication of the reputation of the plaintiff! 
57 It must be admitted at once that the question of how to achieve such protection is a 
difficult one. In part, this is because of problems with the definition of the category of 
public officials. Oearly it is a category which covers a range of people whose actions 
and character are of varying degrees of importance to the public. While it might be 
clear that Members of Parliament, councillors, candidates for public office, diplomats, 
chief executives of state-owned enterprises and departmental beads ought to be 
included there may be less reason for denying more lowly government employees such 
as teachers, doctors and receptionists the same legal protection as people employed in 
the private sector. 
The increasing practice of contracting out government services adds another level of 
complexity. How should we regard consultants, contractors and government agents? 
Similarly, how ought we to treat members of statutory boards, tribunals and authorities, 
and others performing statutory functions such as Justices of the Peace? A further 
problem is that the definition certainly excludes others - such as public figures involved 
in the resolution of important public issues and corporations with power to make 
decisions affecting the lives of thousands of employees and consumers - who ought for 
other reasons to be included, that is, who also ought to be able to offer better-than-usual 
justification for curtailing or punishing statements and commentary about their actions. 
This paper focuses on the people at the core of the category of public officials, the key 
players in our democratic system, those with respect to whom the arguments for freer 
speech are strongest. The narrowness of the focus does not detract from the strength of 
the arguments with respect to these people and the deficiencies of the legal system in 
this area. I recognise, however, that the awkward edges of the public official category 
raise issues of both principle and practical implementation. In part 5 it will be argued 
that the utilisation of a test of "public interest" as part of a general defence of 
reasonable care meets both of these concerns. 
58 F Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enqui~-y (Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 36. 
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through their elected representatives, in a significant sense actually control the 
operation of government. 
Freedom of speech is at the heart of such a system. It is crucial to 
democracy in two ways. First, it embodies the right to speak. If self-
government means that the people are sovereign and their 
representatives are servants, the people must be able to criticise public 
officials, evaluate their character and policies and inform them of their 
wishes so that they can truly "control the operation of government." The 
importance of such comment should not be underestimated. For 
example, the very next day after the airing of the Frontline programme, 
Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer announced new rules requiring 
Ministers publicly to disclose their financial interests and assets. 
Moreover free speech allows tensions to be released and fosters greater 
acceptance of the legitimacy of final decisions. A big problem with the 
laws of defamation in this area is that criticism of policy can all too 
easily be construed as a personal attack on those responsible for its 
formulation. 
Defamation law is often depicted as a balance between the right to speak 
freely and the right to preserve one's reputation. But this is to ignore the 
second crucial aspect of freedom of speech: the right of the public to 
receive information. This right too lies at the core of a democratic 
system, the operation of which is in large part based on the notion of 
infonned choice. "Whenever people are well-informed they can be 
trusted with their own government" said Jefferson. We need to be 
infom1ed about the character of our leaders, their policies and their 
behaviour, particularly at election time. Secrecy, arrogance, 
incompetence and corruption strike at the very heart of democracy by 
destroying the link between government by the people and government 
and government of the people. Freedom of speech is the best control we 
have over the actions of our public officials. A government with the 
ability to silence its critics cannot be said to be democratic. 
B. The Role of the Media 
Clearly the news media are in a special position in this context. They 
are the only non-public organisations whose job it is to investigate and 
report on matters of interest to the public. 59 
Despite their vital role as purveyors of public information, the media 
have an odd half-life in New Zealand politics. Englishman Thomas 
Carlyle referred to the Three Estates in Parliament then added "but in the 
Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Forth Estate, more important far 
than they all." Given that since 1950 New Zealand has had no Upper 
59 The media see it as their duty "to inform the public, to expose injustice and 
corruption, to report on the performance of public institutions and, probably above all, 
to enable the communication between citizens, political leaders, institutions and public 
authorities, of information, comment and ideas that in tum shape opinion and bring 
about action" (Joint Media Submission to the Justice and l.Liw Refonn Committee on 
the Defamation Bill 1988 JL/89/448 19 para 4.5 This submission was presented on 
behalf of the New Zealand Press Association, the New Zealand Publishers' 
Association, Radio New Zealand, TVNZ, The Listener, TV 3 and the Independent 
Broadcasters' Association.) 
House, and given that political parties in New Zealand have historically 
been highly disciplined and successive govenunents have been strongly 
cabinet oriented and prodigious in their legislative efforts, we might 
expect the New Zealand press to be cherished as a public watchdog, an 
important institutional check on the government. 
Not a bit of it. The New Zealand public accords to journalists about the 
same level of admiration and trust as it gives used car salespersons. At 
the same time, oddly enough, New Zealand's press is often said to be 
more responsible and restrained than its counterparts overseas. It is 
submitted that insufficient recognition is given in New Zealand to the 
centrality of the media to the operation of democratic government. In the 
United States, the press is protected as a Constitutional check on the 
operation of the state.60 The same certainly cannot be said of New 
Zealand. 
C. Changing Social, Political and Technological Conditions 
Writing in 1968, Alison Quentin-Baxter described the United States' 
position as "the product of a different conceptual and philosophical 
approach; and a response to the different needs of a different 
environment." She explained61 
I suggest we assess the New Zealand law relating to defamation in its own 
setting: the smaller community, the greater facility for checking the truth of what 
is published before it goes to print, the comparatively few channels by which 
information may reach the public, the absence of constitutional provisions which 
can be re-meshed as required to accommodate changes in the balance of 
interests ... looking at the picture as a whole , I reach the conclusion that there is 
nothing in the law of defamation which should make the press afraid to speak 
out in a responsible manner on matters which the public should know. 
Mrs Quentin-Baxter makes two important points. The first is that any 
assessment of the adequacy of a law cannot be divorced from its social, 
political and technological context. It is still true that New Zealand is, in 
international terms, a small community. However, the past twenty years 
have seen a revolution in communications technology (including the 
development of FM radio, satellite television transmission and pay TV), 
the deregulation of the broadcasting industry and a proliferation in the 
number of television and radio stations and publications of various sorts. 
There are many more "channels by which information can reach the 
public." Our news organisations are swamped with information from a 
huge variety of sources around the world every day and face a much 
greater degree of competition as they package it for public consumption. 
They also face a much increased demand for discussion of and comment 
on public affairs. Thus the media cannot reasonably be expected to have 
the same "facility for checking the truth of what is published" as they 
had in the 1960' s. 
60 See Part 4 below. 
61 "Freedom of the Press" in K Keith (ed) Essays on Hwnan Rights (Sweet & 
Maxwell, Wellington, 1968), 70. 
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Furthermore, in the 1990's, New Zealand does have a constitutional 
statute, the Bill of Rights Act. Although this is not supreme law, it may 
yet be used to accommodate changes in the balance of interests.62 
The New Zealand of the 1990's is a very different country to that of the 
1960's. The 1980's in particular was a decade of radical political and 
ideological change. In the early 1980's the National government 
embarked on a programme of massive borrowing to finance huge public 
projects and kept a tight grip on the economy using measures such as a 
price and wage freeze, a reserve assets requirement for banks and 
controls on interest rates . The Labour government of 1984-1990 
reversed these policies, implementing a series of market-oriented 
reforms. Its campaign of privatisation, corporatisation and restructuring 
(most noticeably in the areas of defence, education and health) changed 
the face of New Zealand 's society and government. Controversial 
legislation was also passed concerning such divisive issues as the 
decriminalisation of homosexual relations, the creation of a nuclear free 
zone around New Zealand, the relaxation of controls on abortion and the 
establishment of an employment equity regime.63 The reforms have 
continued unabated since National took office in 1990, with major 
changes including the reorganisation of the labour market and the 
redesign of the welfare state. 
What does all of this have to do with the laws of defamation? The 
answer lies in the changes that have been wrought in the attitudes of the 
public. New Zealanders of the 1990's of necessity it seems have a 
greater knowledge of and interest in political developments. There is 
widespread dissatisfaction with government policies and mistrust of 
politicians. People are more hardened and cynical. There is also 
discontent with the existing political system with calls for electoral 
reform and greater use of referenda becoming more frequent and 
strident. As well, there is an increasing awareness of minority rights and 
a proliferation of interest groups such as Age Concern, LIFE, ASH , 
HART and Greenpeace to protect sectoral interests and press for political 
change by mobilising public opinion. 
These factors, together with both the National and Labour governments' 
commitment to openness and non-interference, have produced a much 
greater tolerance for robust - and even aggressive - debate in New 
Zealand. In light of the momentous changes that are occurring, vigorous 
political argument is both natural and necessary. Politicians are leading 
the way, even within their own parties! People, and particularly 
politicians, cannot afford to be thinskinned these days. And people 
doing the criticising should not have to afford to compensate them for 
their bruised egos as a result of defamation laws which are out of step 
with modem attitudes and needs. 
62 See below Part 7. 
63 The Employment Equity Act 1990 bas subsequently been repealed. 
18 
D. The Chill Effect 
Ms Quentin-Baxter's second assertion is that New Zealand's defamation 
laws do not "chill" the media, that is, inhibit responsible reporting on 
matters of public interest.64 It seems, however, that many journalists, 
editors, lawyers and media commentators do not share her opinion. 
Recent data on the increasing number and size of defamation claims 
seem to bear out these concerns. 65 Journalists find they "cannot get 
important stories to print because of the law."66 The New Zealand 
Journalists' Union submitted that huge solicitors' bills, capricious legal 
outcomes and massive damage awards hamper the media's role in 
circulating information and enhancing public debate. 
Editors tend to agree. The Joint Media Submission to the Select 
Committee considering the Defamation Bill states6 7 
As editors we believe the unreasonable and uncertain risks posed by the law of 
defamation prevent the publication of many matters which a proper fulfilment of 
our responsibility to the public interest would require. It is accepted, and 
entirely necessary, that due care and responsibility must be exercised in 
discharging that function. It is our experience, however, that the uncertainties 
and indistinct hazards of the law discourage the full and adequate reporting of 
many matters of legitimate public concern. 
These problems were recognised by the McKay Committee which 
pointed out that the New Zealand press is not large and wealthy and has 
little ability to resist threats, defend proceedings and pay damages. 6 S 
The Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (BCNZ) recently wasted 
$60 OOO preparing for a trial which did not eventuate. According to 
BCNZ lawyer Leigh Hodgson the accuracy of the story was never in 
doubt except in the mind of the plaintiff.69 Many news organisations 
cannot afford to engage in that so1t of legal battle. For independent local 
newspapers and small community radio stations, for exan1ple, a large 
damages award - or even a hefty legal bill - could be crippling. They are 
forced to adopt the policy "when in doubt, leave it out." The McKay 
Committee's questionnaire revealed that almost 80% of those who are 
responsible for publication decisions had excluded material which they 
felt was in the public interest to publish.7° There are even reports of 
64 Others, too, are skeptical about the existence of the chill effect. See, for example, C 
French "Defamation Law Reform - A Special Defence for the Media?" 4 Ot LR No 3 
370 (1979); T Goddard "Defamation - The Committee Reports" (1978] NZl.J 96; and 
the Faulks Committee - Report of the Committee on Defamation (1975 Cmnd 5909) 
para 214(b). 
65 See discussion on gagging writs, above n 53. 
66 Secretary of the Canterbury-Westland branch of the Journalists' Union J Hao1pton 's 
submission to the Select Committee lists a series of exao1ples in which important public 
information was suppressed because of its defamatory potential. JL/89/456 25W, 1-2. 
67 Above n 59, para 5.9. 
68 Above n 13, para 233. 
69 Submission to the Justice and Law Reform Committee on the Defamation Bill 
JL/89/440 14 para 8.4 · 
70 Above n 13, 133-140. 
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occasions on which retractions and apologies have been issued by news 
organisations even when they were certain their story was accurate.71 
E. The Argument From Truth 
It seems, then, that editors are forced to think long and hard before 
publishing material which may be ta.ken as defamatory - even when it 
concerns great and weighty issues. We have seen that such self-
censorship has grave implications for the operation of a participatory 
democracy because it hampers our ability to give and receive 
information and opinions about the performance of our leaders and civil 
servants. There is another more philosophical reason why political 
speech ought to receive special protection. It is the "argument from 
truth".72 This points out that we cannot assume our own infallibility and 
should not deny ourselves the chance to hear and evaluate all points of 
view because they might be right or partially right. 
The Frontline programme provides a good example. Whatever its 
shortcomings, if it had been suppressed out of a fear of defamation 
actions, the public would have been denied a useful source of 
information and comment on several important issues. 
It may seem odd to talk of "truth" in connection with political discussion 
and criticism. Perhaps it would be better to speak of "better" or "worse" 
policies and leaders. The point is that our system, in the words of Justice 
Learned Hand "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be 
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of 
authoritative selection."73 The airing of even the most disruptive ideas 
(which are the most likely to be defamatory) is crucial to the health and 
stability of society. These test societal assumptions and have often been 
instrumental in the achievement of great leaps forward in scientific, 
economic and political thought. Today's heresy is tomorrow's 
orthodoxy. 
Frederick Shauer argues that we can more readily justify the suppression 
of some categories of speech than others.74 We can be very certain of 
ourselves when we say that the earth is round or that torturing innocent 
children is bad. The risk that these beliefs are wrong is tiny and the 
consequences of error are negligible. The same cannot be said of 
political speech. Majorities have no monopoly on the truth. Prevailing 
political "truths" are more likely than most categories of knowledge to 
be overturned with the passage of time. The chance of mistake when we 
71 See, for example "Lies and Libel" The Listener 27 August 1983, 22. Further 
evidence of these attitudes is provided in Greg Lisk 's Dissertation "Defamation and its 
Effect on Freedom Of Speech" (above n 10). Lisk interviewed several prominent 
editors and concluded that in their treatment of dubious business concerns, shoddy 
products, crime, local government problems and criticism of public figures the media 
often feel compelled to "play safe", err on the side of caution, water down or suppress 
stories and stick to the basic facts. 
72 Above n 58, eh 2-3. 
73 US v Associated Press (1943) 52 F Supp 362, 372. 
74 Above D 58, 32-34. 
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assume for example that a Minister is competent and honest or that small 
government is beneficial is much higher. Furthermore, because our 
leaders' decisions affect us in so many ways - taxes, social welfare, the 
provision of public facilities and services, the operation of SO Es and so 
forth - the consequences of error are much greater in the political field. 
It has already been shown how difficult it is to avoid casting defamatory 
slurs in the heat of political debate. If freedom speech is not given 
"breathing space" by allowing people the right to say things which might 
tum out to be wrong - then inevitably there will be a cost in terms of 
political truth. Do we really want to sacrifice political truth at the altar 
of personal reputation? 
F. A Bias in the Law? 
It should be remembered that not all utterances are subject to the 
possibility of an action for defamation. Speeches in Parliament, for 
example, and official statements made between high officers of state, are 
absolutely privileged.75 
The removal of these protections would create an uproar amongst 
politicians. "Parliamentary privilege is essential to the workings of 
democracy" they would cry. "We need to be able to speak honestly and 
fearlessly; the interests of democracy would not be served by gutless and 
brutally edited speeches by timorous MPs quailing at the prospect of 
attracting storms of defamation writs. We need to be able to debate 
governmental policies with full vigour and expose the mistakes and 
improprieties of New Zealand's elected and appointed officials. 
Besides, we have our own internal disciplinary procedures which ensure 
that we do not abuse our privileges." 
Admittedly there is another reason for according privilege to 
Parliamentary proceedings: it can be argued that the doctrine of 
separation of powers would be violated if Parliamentary speech could be 
called into question in a court of law. However, the point is not that 
Parliamentary privilege should be taken away. Nor that all political 
speech should be absolutely privileged. The point is that most of the 
reasons for protecting speech in the House also apply with equal force to 
the speech of other political commentators. 
Politicians and executive officials are not the only people whose job it is 
the expose the shortcomings of the government. They are not 
necessarily even the best qualified to do so. Nor have they been 
noticeably more responsible or accurate than most of the media. It is 
submitted that the fundamental difference between politicians and the 
media lies not in their respective indispensibility to democratic 
government, but in their ability (or inability) to pass laws to protect their 
interests! 
The media does receive some special legal protection against 
defamation. Section 17 of the Defamation Act confers qualified 
privilege on media groups (for they are the only ones able to publish the 
75 See generally Gatley, above o 38, paras 414-425. 
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requisite explanation or contradiction) when they are making fair and 
accurate reports of various public, judicial and governmental 
proceedings and statements. 76 Donald Zillman avers that 77 
the law is biased toward the disclosure of public information through 
government channels. The same statement on a matter of public interest may be 
treated differently in a defamation action according to the person publishing the 
statement and the circumstances of the publication. 
The facilitation of the media's ability to disseminate official information 
to the public is certainly a good thing. But is there not an imbalance 
here? It seems a little undemocratic for the pronouncements of those 
people already in positions of power to be specially protected. As their 
statements may well be more likely to be reported by than those of their 
critics they may be able to exercise a disproportionate influence over the 
views of the public . Participatory democracy relies on informed, not 
half-informed, choice. 
G. New Zealand's International Obligations 
Finally, it is arguable that as they stand our defamation laws fall foul of 
our international obligations.7 8 Article 19(2) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 79, which New Zealand ratified in 
1979, states that: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek , receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice. 
Clause (3) recognises that the right entails "special duties and 
responsibilities" and permits "such restrictions as are provided by law 
and are necessary ... [amongst other things] for respect of the rights or 
reputations of others." 
It is clear that New Zealand's defamation laws constitute a prima facie 
interference with this right to freedom of expression . It is also clear that 
they are designed to protect the reputations of others. Probably the laws 
are sufficiently clear to meet the requirement that they be "provided by 
law".80 The question is, can they be said to be "necessary"?81 
76 See above n 39. 
77 D Zillman "The American Approach to Defamation" 9 Anglo-American U 316 
(1980),319. 
78 This question might arise in the context of a complaint to the Human Rights 
Committee under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant (999 UNTS 302) which New 
Zealand has also ratified. This process may serve as an extra layer of appeal for a 
defendant whose speech has been punished in the New Zealand courts . 
79 999 UNTS 171 ("the Covenant"). 
80 The equivalent provision in the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("prescribed by law") has been interpreted by the 
European Court as requiring that the law be adequately accessible and "formubted with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct..." (Sunday Times case 
ECHR Series A, vol. 30 (1979),4, paras 48-49.) In view of the difficulties faced by the 
media and their lawyers who must try to gauge the limits of acceptable language - and 
particularly with respect to the legal mystery that is common law qualified privilege -
there is room to argue that the law is not sufficiently clear to enable the citizen "to 
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances,the consequences which a 
giveo actioo may entail" (Sunday Times case, para 49,) However, in the Sunday Times 
To my knowledge, British-style defamation common law has not yet 
been judicially tested against international human rights standards, so the 
question is an open one. 82 
However, it is strongly arguable that New Zealand's defamation laws 
curtail our freedom of speech to a degree that is not strictly socially 
necessary to protect reputations in an open and broadminded society. In 
particular, measured against the standards outlined in footnote SZ above, 
the law seems to take insufficient account of the special considerations 
that apply to political speech. It might be argued that the defences of fair 
Case the common law of contempt, which is arguably even more uncertain than the law 
of defamation, was regarded by the majority as acceptable under the Convention, so the 
laws of defamation would probably pass this test as well. 
81 The context of Article 19 would suggest that the real question is whether our laws 
are necessary in a democratic society . See Articles 21 and 22 of the Covenant. 
82 The European Court of Human Rights bas, however, laid down the approach to take 
when interpreting the similarly-worded article 10: 
(i) The right should be broadly construed and the allowable restrictions interpreted 
narrowly. (Sunday Times case, para 65) Perhaps this approach has less validity in the 
context of defamation law as Article 17 of the Covenant recognises a right to protection 
against attacks on reputation. 
(ii) The hallmarks of a democratic society are pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness. (Handyside case ECHR Series A, vol. 24 (1976), 4, paras 49, 146). 
(iii) "Necessity" implies the existence of a "pressing social need" (Sunday Times case 
para 59) 
(iv) State Parties are given a "margin of appreciation" with respect to the necessity of a 
particular interference. The margin is narrower the more justiciable is the issue 
(Sunday Times case, para 59). It is submitted that, compared with the category of 
"protection of morals" the question of what is necessary for the protection of reputation 
is a much more objective one so a smaller margin of appreciation is appropriate . 
(v) The media have a duty to "impart infomiation and ideas on political issues just as 
on other areas of public interest" (Lingens case Series A, No 103 8 EHRR 407 (1986) 
para 41) and the public have a corresponding right to receive such information (Sunday 
Times case para 65). 
(vi) Two recent European Court decisions are of particular relevance to this paper. In 
the Lingens case, which concerned a prosecution for criminal libel, it was held that 
"freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society 
which prevails throughout the Convention. The limits of acceptable criticism are 
accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. 
Unlike the latter, the fom1er inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close 
scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and be 
must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance" (para 42) 
These comments were echoed in Oberschlick v Austria Series A, EHRR vol. 204 
(1991). 
The Human Rights Committee, whose job it is to monitor States Parties' compliance 
with the Covenant, evidently agrees that political speech requires special protection. In 
1988, for example, it asked the representative from Zaire about "the possibilities for 
lawful expression of opinion critical of the government or its members" (N43/40 para 
107). In 1989 it went as far as to suggest that Article 19 was relevant to the actions for 
defamation instituted by the President of Bolivia against members of the opposition 
(N44/40 para 424). Further, when questioning the Tunisian representative on the 
report submitted by his country 
it was asked "whether there was a growing tendency to offer less protection to political 
and other personalities against the danger of libel or whether instead there continued to 
be a relatively rigid system of protection for public; figures" (N45/40 para 526). 
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comment and qualified privilege provide adequate protection for 
comments on matters of public interest. It is submitted, however, that 
the scope of these defences is too limited and their application too 
uncertain83 to meet the standards set out in the Covenant and that the 
overrestrictiveness of defamation laws in New Zealand may very well 
amount to a breach of Article 19. 84 
Conclusion 
Democratic principle, the communications revolution, constitutional 
impoverishment, massive political reform, attitudinal metamorphosis, the 
"chilling" of the media, the philosophy of truth, bias in the common law, 
international obligations ... this discussion has covered a lot of territory. 
The main point I have been trying the make is that there is something 
peculiarly important about political speech that justifies giving it more 
weight in its tug of war with reputation. We should be slower to 
interfere with political speech because it is vital to the operation of a 
democratic system of government, particularly New Zealand's system of 
government and more particularly New Zealand's system of government 
in the 1990's. Our need for - and increasingly, our expectation of -
vigorous debate, frank criticism and bold, probing journalism is being 
frustrated (or at the very least is not compatible with) laws which 
effectively require us to stop before we say something that might reflect 
badly on someone and only say it if is provably true, technically 
comment or we are prepared to take a chance that it will be accorded 
privilege. 
How might we improve the law so that it better accords with the 
principle of free political speech? It is submitted that the best approach 
is to insist that those commenting on the conduct, character and policies 
of our public officials be found at fault in some way before liability is 
imposed for defamation. Under present law it is not enough that the 
speaker has taken all reasonable care in relation to the facts. 
It may be objected that it is unfair to treat public officials differently to 
other plaintiffs. I would reply that it is both unfair and dangerous not to 
recognise that such people are different to other plaintiffs in that they are 
in a position of public trust, are being paid by the public, are making 
decisions which affect us all, and can be taken to have accepted the risk 
of vigorous criticism when they accepted public office. It should also be 
borne in mind that public officials generally have greater access than 
private persons to media channels to explain or contradict defamatory 
allegations. Furthermore, such a change would at least partially bring 
defamation into line with other torts, which virtually all require that fault 
be proved before liability is imposed. 
In Part 4 I will examine the US response to the question of how to 
implement the principle that political speech ought to be accorded 
special protection. In Parts 5 and 6 I will find out whether that question 
has even been asked in New Zealand. 
83 See discussion in Part 2B above. 
84 These points may well be relevant to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. See 
Part 7 below. 
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PART 4. THE US RULE 
The American law relating to the defamation of public officials was 
initially based on the common law and gave no special protection to 
those commenting on their actions. But that changed in 1964. New York 
Times v Sullivan 85 was a watershed in US legal history . The US 
Supreme Court was the battleground for an elemental clash of values 
between the First Amendment's protection of free speech and free press 
and the darling of the common law, the right to reputation. The result 
was a knock-out win to the First Amendment, the embodiment, it was 
held, of the principle of "uninhibited, robust and wide open debate on 
public issues". 86 
The Sullivan case introduced a rule prohibiting87 
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
bis official conduct unless be proves that the statement was made with actual 
malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false ... 
So a public official must now prove fault in order to make out a case. 
What is more, it is clear that the recklessness standard is objective. To 
succeed, the plaintiff must adduce clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. 88 
It appears that, like fair comment, this "constitutional privilege" applies 
to all defendants whether or not they are part of the media.89 However, 
it is clear that, unlike fair comment, this defence can protect falsely 
stated facts . Public interest in the matter is presumed. And the 
defendant's motive (central to common law malice) is irrelevant. 
The application of the Sullivan doctrine was extended in a series of 
subsequent cases. It quickly came to be applied, as one commentator put 
it, to "all government employees, no matter how inferior their positions, 
and some persons and entities not employed by a government at all. "90 
A distinction propounded in Rosenblatt v Baer9 1 which limited the 
categories of public officials to those whose position tends to invite 
scrutiny and discussion independently of the circumstances of the 
particular controversy in which he or she is embroiled, was "all but 
ignored. "92 
85 376 us 254. 
86 Above n 85, 270. 
87 Above n 85, 270. 
88 StAmantv Thompson 890 US 727 (1968). 
89 Dun & Bradstreet v Greenmoss Builders Inc 472 US 323 (1985) 
90 J Eaton "The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v Robert Welch Inc and 
Beyond : An Analytical Primer" 61 Virg LR 1349, 1376. 
91 383 us 75 (1966). 
92 Above n 90, 
Further, the Sullivan defence was held to apply to criminal libel relating 
to public officials; 93 to the private conduct of public officials for 
statements which touch on their fitness for office;94 to public figures95 
and even to private individuals if statements concern "matters of general 
or public interest".96 
However, in Gertz v Robert Welch Inc9 7 the Supreme Court 
backpedalled a little. It held that to extend the constitutional privilege to 
statements about private individuals would "abridge the legitimate state 
interest [in protecting reputation] to a degree that we find 
unacceptable. ,,93 Gertz rejects a test which hinges on the subject matter 
of the statement and focuses instead on the character of the plaintiff.99 
The Sullivan privilege, it was held, can only be used against two types of 
plaintiff: all-purpose and limited-purpose public figures.100 
It is clear form this brief survey of US case law that a different balance 
has been struck from that which exists in the common law. In the US, a 
defamed public official faces extraordinary difficulty in making out a 
claim for defamation. Not only is the burden of proof on the plaintiff to 
establish fault , but the level of fault required (malice or recklessness) is 
high. 
It is widely believed101 that the US rules lead to the publication of many 
important public facts, most of them true, in circumstances where "they 
would not see the light of day [in Britain], except perhaps through the 
devious and unsatisfactory device of Parliamentary privilege."102 It 
does not seem to have led to an epidemic of journalistic sloppiness, for 
as Geoffrey Robertson notes, reckless and malicious behaviour is not 
93 Garrison v Louisiana 379 US 64 (1967). 
94 Above n 93. 
95 That is, persons who are "ultimately involved in the resolution of important public 
questions, or by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at 
large": Curtis v Butts , Associated Press v Walker 388 US 130 (1967), 164. 
96 Rosenbloom v Metromedia Inc 403 US 29 (1971), 31, 44. 
97 418 us 323 (1974). 
98 Above n 97, 346. 
99 Also see Time v Firestone 424 US 448 (1976). 
100 All-purpose public figures are those who "occupy positions of such pervasive 
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes" (above n 97, 
345). Limited-purpose public figures are people who have voluntarily "thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues iovolved"(above n 97, 345). They are public figures only in 
connection with particular issues . The Court in Gertz did not stop there . It went on to 
reshape the law of defamation relating to private persons and the publication of private 
matters about public figures as well. It held that even plaintiffs who were private 
citizens could not sustain an action for defamation without proving some element of 
fault, though individual states were left some discretion over the degree of fault which 
had to be proved. Further, it held that presumed and punitive damages in such cases 
were unconstitutional. 
101 For example, Zillman, above n 77,327; Robertson, above n 21, 26; Shauer, above 
n 72,172. 
102 Robertson, above n 21 , 26. 
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protected and newspapers are public figures themselves and when they 
overstep the mark their competitors are only to pleased to point it out 
using every inch of the latitude provided by law. Nor do "sensitive and 
honourable" people seem to have been deterred from seeking public 
office leaving "these positions open to others who have no regard for 
their reputation", 103 although these matters are not easy to prove. 
Problems with the Public Figure Rule 
There have been calls for the public figure doctrine to be adopted in New 
Zealand and elsewhere in the commonwealth.104 However, most 
commentators, including the committees established to review 
defamation law in New Zealand and Britain and the Australian Law 
Reform Commission, seem to think that his would be a bad idea. They 
argue that the US law is too extreme in principle, too uncertain in 
practice and may not even achieve the intended freeing-up of speech. It 
is submitted that there is much truth in these criticisms. 
The public official rule has been attacked as excessive in three ways. 
First, it is wrong to draw a distinction that separates out people who are 
prominent in public affairs and for that reason alone accords them less 
protection against defamatory statements. I have already argued against 
this proposition in Part 3. 
Secondly, the US rule is too wide. It works against too many plaintiffs, 
including many not covered by the original rationale in Sullivan, that is 
that criticism of public officials should be robust and unimpeded. For 
example, Zillman suggests that Mohammed Ali and Sir Lawrence 
Olivier would fall into the category of general purpose public figures and 
therefore would be "fair game" for everyone whose allegations and 
comments were not malicious or reckless.105 Under the reasoning 
advanced on this paper, there is no special reason to give any special 
protection to statements and comment about movie stars, sports heroes, 
beauty queens and the like. The public is naturally curious about such 
people but that does not justify denying them the legal protection against 
defamation accorded to less famous members of the public. 
The third objection to the Sullivan doctrine is that it is too harsh on the 
many plaintiffs who fall within its scope. It is not enough that the 
defendant has negligently got the facts wrong. For the plaintiff to 
recover, the defendant must have known that the facts were wrong, or at 
least entertained real doubts as to their accuracy. Furthermore it is the 
plaintiff who must prove this mental element. Although I have argued 
that a shift in the balance struck by the law of defamation between 
speech and reputation is desirable, the US rule puts almost all of the 
weight on the side of free speech. A better balance might be provided by 
a simple negligence test, or at least a different allocation of the burden of 
proving malice. 
103 Gatley, above n 38, para 488 n 65. 
104 For example, G Palmer, above n 10; 2 submissions to the McKay Committee, 
above n 13 para 488. 
105 Above n 77,323. 
There have also been problems with the practical application of the rule. 
Its scope is uncertain. Says Dean Prosser "[t]he precise boundaries of 
the constitutional privilege have not as yet been determined, and they 
may not be for many years."106 This is one of the Australian Law 
Reform Commission's main difficulties with the Sullivan approach: 
there is no satisfactory way of specifying the plaintiffs to whom it 
applies.1°7 Moreover, there is always the possibility that the Supreme 
c.ourt will see fit to expand or restrict the scope of the doctrine in any 
given case. 
In New Zealand, the McKay Committee concluded that the United States 
rule ought not to be adopted in New Zealand because of the potential for 
its abuse.108 If the public figure rule were adopted in New Zealand, said 
the Committee, "too much emphasis would be placed on the principle of 
free speech at the expense of the equally fundamental principle that 
reputation deserves reasonable protection ... "109 I respectfully agree 
with this conclusion. The balance should be struck in a much fairer and 
clearer way than has been achieved in the US.110 
The next Parts of the paper consider the McKay Committee's main 
recommendation and the provisions of the Defamation Bill. What do the 
Committee members and politicians believe is the appropriate balance 
for New Zealand? 
106 W Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5ed, West Publishing Co., 1984), 
805. 
107 Above n 11, 252. Even the categorisation of the petitioner as a private figure in 
Gertz itself is open to question - Gertz was a prominent author and public speaker and 
lawyer for public causes. 
108 "We have doubts as to the possible effects of such a privilege, particularly at 
election time. The US rule could open the door to irresponsible journalism based on 
speculation rather than facts and it is difficult to accept that a licence to state false facts 
is necessary for healthy journalism." (Above n 13, para 490). 
109 Above n 13, para 16. 
110 It is interesting to note, however, that whatever the balance between speech and 
reputation in US legal theory, the reality is quite different. Professor Nadine Strossen 
argues that the chill effect of the law continues, because plaintiffs do not sue in 
defamation to win, they sue to punish the media and air their side of the story. The 
chill effect, then, resides in the continuing willingness of defamed people to sue, the 
fact that 80% of a defendant's total expenses are made up of attorneys' fees and costs, 
and the new focus of the law on the state of mind of journalists rather than of the truth 
or falsity of what they a.re saying: defendants are subjected to a minute examination of 
their beliefs, attitudes and motives including exhaustive pretrial discovery of 
journalistic information and outtak:es (See Herbert v Lando 60 LED 115 (1979), N 
Strossen "Proposed Reforms of Defamation Law" Conference Papers New Zealand 
Law Conference (Trilogy Business Systems, 1987), 121. The lesson for New Zealand 
is that the legal pall that hangs over political speech can only be lifted if procedural 
reforms go hand in hand with substantive ones. 
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PART 5. A STATUTORY DEFENCE FOR THE MEDIA 
In 1975 the New Zealand government appointed a special Committee to 
make recommendations on ways of improving the existing law of 
defamation. The McKay Report was released in December 1987. The 
Committee concluded that the present law favours plaintiffs too heavily 
and made a wide array of recommendations, both substantive and 
procedural, many of which have been included in the Defamation Bill. 
Many of these, such as the liberalisation of the defences of fair comment 
and justification and the provisions aimed at curbing the issue of gagging 
writs would, if enacted , break down some of the barriers to political 
speech in New Zealand. These measures will be discussed in Part 6 
below. 
However, the Committee's most novel and important recommendation 
has not been included in the Bill. The Committee believed that the 
enactment of a special statutory defence for the media would tilt the 
balance of the law back in favour of the free flow of information which it 
felt was unduly inhibited because of the harsh treatment meted out to 
those guilty of accidental defamation.111 
The Elements of the Defence and the Free Political Speech Principle 
The defence was to be available to the media when they were stating 
facts or making comment on a matter of public interest, acting honestly 
and with reasonable care, and had agreed to offer the person defamed an 
opportunity to publish a statement explaining or rebutting the offending 
item. 112 
111 Above n 13, para 230. 
112 The draft provision was phrased as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, matter published in a news medium shall 
be protected by qualified privilege if: 
(a) The subject-matter of the publication was one of public interest at the time of 
publication; and 
(b) So far as the matter consists of statements of fact, the person by whom it was 
published, at the time of publication acted with reasonable care in all the circumstances 
and believed on reasonable grounds that the statements of fact were true; and 
(c) So far as the matter is an expression of opioion-
(i) The opinion was at the time of publication the genuine opinion of the person 
by whom it was published; and 
(ii) The opinion was at the time of publication capable of being supported by 
statements of fact to which paragraph (b) of this subsection applies , either by 
themselves of in conjunction with any other facts known at the time of 
publication to the person to whom the publication was made; and 
(d) The defendant has given the person who claims to be defan1ed by the publication an 
opportunity to have a reasonable statement of explanation or of rebuttal, or both 
explanation and of rebuttal, published in the same medium as the publication 
complained of, with adequate prominence and without undue delay. 
(2) A defence of qualified privilege under this section by a defendant shall fail unless 
he proves: 
(a) Where he has received a written complaint from the aggrieved person, that within 
30 days of receiving the complaint, the defendant supplied to that person a statement in 
writing specifying-
,,.,o 
L _,., 
As the Auckland District Law Society's Public Issues Committee says, 
this is hardly a defamer's charter. 113 For a start the media must exercise 
reasonable care in relation to their facts. The defence does not protect 
those who negligently or recklessly or deliberately get things wrong. 
The standard is to be that of the ordinary reasonable journalist and the 
Committee envisages a "sliding scale" of responsibility depending on the 
reliability of the source, the urgency of the publication, the seriousness 
of the allegation and so forth. 114 The codes of journalistic practice and 
the decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority could provide 
some of the background for an evaluation of the reasonableness of 
journalists' actions . This standard is flexible enough to respond to the 
realities of journalistic life and would mesh closely with public 
expectations and professional ethics. 
Secondly, comment must be based at least partly on stated facts which 
meet this reasonableness requirement. This should give readers and 
viewers a chance to weigh the facts for themselves and form and 
informed opinion about the comment. It should also deter exaggeration. 
Thirdly, there is a requirement that the person defamed be given a 
prompt and reasonably prominent right of reply. This requirement is 
common in continental countries, where it seems to be accepted as fair 
and workable even though it is often made compulsory and is available 
to everyone who is mentioned in the media.115 Nor is it completely new 
to New Zealand, having featured in the statutory defences of qualified 
privilege and unintentional defamation since the enactment of the 
Defamation Bill in 1954. l l6 
This element is designed to protect the interests of defamed persons. But 
it also serves the public's right to receive information. The public gets to 
hear both sides of the story fairly closely together and not simply in an 
article about the outcome of a defamation trial published two years after 
the initial allegation. 
(i) The grounds on which the defendant believed that the statements of fact in 
the publication were true; and 
(ii) the steps, if any, that the defendant bad taken to verity the accuracy of those 
statements of fact; and 
(b) That in giving the aggrieved person the opportunity to have a statement published 
under subsection 1 (d) of this section the defendant offered to pay-
(i) The costs of publication; and 
(ii) The solicitor and client costs of the aggrieved person claiming to have been 
defamed; and 
(iii) All other expenses reasonably incurred in the matter by the person claiming 
to have been defamed. 
(3) In an action for defamation that is tried before a judge and jury, where a defence of 
qualified privilege under this section is raised, it shall be for the judge alone to 
determine whether the defence is established. 
113 Public Figures and the Law of Defamation Auckland District Law Society Public 
Issues Committee 1983, 6. 
114 Above n 11, para 246. 
l15 Above n 13, paras 492-495; above n 11, para 178. 
116 Ss 6 and 17. 
30 
Another advantage of this remedy is that it addresses the harm caused by 
the defamatory statement, that is, injury to reputation, much more 
directly than does monetary compensation. It is also cheaper 
(particularly for the complainant whose costs are paid by the publisher), 
faster and less acrimonious than a legal battle. All of these factors help 
reduce the chill effect. 
Finally the subject of the facts or comment must be a matter of public 
interest. The McKay Committee felt that the enactment of a definition 
of "public interest" would be undesirable.117 
The question of its precise scope would be left to the court which could 
draw upon its statements about public interest in relation to fair 
comment and privilege. Such a test would have the flexibility to 
develop as public attitudes changed without creating the oppressive 
uncertainty that surrounds qualified privilege at common law. 
Note that this requirement also provides some measure of protection for 
privacy. 118 Embarrassing personal information relating to private 
behaviour or personal relationships cannot be said to be "in the public 
interest" - even if it is true and concerns a public figure - unless it can 
be shown to relate to an area of public life. 
Plainly the matters discussed in this paper fall within this concept. 
Prominent businessmen operating trusts of shares for leading 
politicians, the personal receipt by Cabinet Ministers of big political 
donations, allegations by former members of the governing party's 
National Executive Council that it discussed a debt-for-government 
contracts trade-off: these are clearly matters of public interest.119 It is 
also clear that the McKay defence covers many other subjects besides 
political ones. It might include, for example, allegations about the 
activities of business and union leaders or comment about the quality of 
products or services offered to the public. 
Thus the principle of free political speech does not exhaust the 
arguments about the McKay defence. The principle developed in this 
paper applies only to public officials, and with decreasing force to those 
117 However, it cited Gatley to give an indication of the breadth of the concept. 
Matters of public interest, says Gatley, include "the public conduct of any [person] who 
holds, or seeks, a public office or position of public trust, political and state matters, 
church matters, the administration of justice, the management of public institutions, the 
administration of local affairs by local authorities, books, pictures and works of art 
generally ... and anything which may fairly be said to invite comment or challenge 
public attention." (R McEwan and P Lewis Gatley on Libel and Slander (7ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1974), para 733; McKay Committee above n 13, para 239.) The 
Australian Law Reform Commission, on the other hand. felt that a statutory indication 
of the sorts of matters that were in the public interest should be provided: above n 11, p 
209 (Draft Bill cl 7(3).) 
118 Above n 113, 6. 
119 Whether or not the other elements of the proposed defence were actually satisfied 
by the TVNZ staff is a different question. TVNZ would probably have difficulty 
establishing that it took reasonable care and offered an adequate right of reply. 
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with less authority and responsibility. What we can say, however, is 
that public officials certainly fall within the concept of public interest to 
the extent necessary to satisfy the free political speech principle. 
What is more, this approach eschews the problems associated with the 
definition of the category of public officials because it focuses on the 
subject matter of the facts and comment. That sort of approach was 
quickly rejected in the US because it tipped the balance too far against 
the protection of reputation, but the McKay defence is much more 
closely circumscribed, requiring as it does the offer of a right of reply 
and the exercise of reasonable care and placing the burden of proof on 
the defendant. Thus the free political speech principle provides strong 
support for the adoption of the McKay defence. 
Problems with the Defence 
The defence has its detractors. 120 Those who oppose it argue that the 
balance struck in New Zealand's defamation law is already about right; 
that the common law defences offer sufficient protection for the media; 
that the chill effect does not exist; giving the press freedom to "malign 
with virtual impunity will unleash a torrent of defamatory material"; 121 
that the right of reply will do little to restore a defamed person's good 
name; that it does not stop the publisher from repeating the libel; that 
the defence will add to the complexity, length and cost of defamation 
actions; and that anyway it is impossible to legislate investigative 
journalism into existence - the media's tight budget and general 
community attitudes are much greater constraints than the defamation 
law. 
The first three objections have been addressed earlier. It is submitted 
that the fourth does not give enough credit to constraints of professional 
ethics, or to the limits of the defence, particularly the requirements that 
the media act reasonably and give defamed persons a chance to put their 
sides of the story. As for the adequacy of the right of reply provision, it 
must be admitted that a rebuttal or explanation would not have the 
impact of a retraction or apology, and that it cannot magically erase the 
effects of the original defamatory statement, but as a second-best 
solution it is a lot better than a lengthy and expensive court battle. It is 
quick, it is cheap, it is fair, it tackles the harm done as far as possible, 
and there is nothing to prevent responsible publishers from themselves 
acknowledging and apologising for any errors that are pointed out to 
them. If they repeated the defamatory statement after that it would be 
difficult for them to argue that they had taken reasonable care with their 
facts on the second occasion. 
While the defence may add to the complexity of cases which do come 
to trial, its very aim is to avoid the need for such trials in the first place 
by providing a mechanism for defamed persons to use instead of going 
120 See, for example, French, above n 64. 
121 French, above n 64, 374. 
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to court.122 It is to be hoped that this defence would lead to less overall 
litigation, not more. 
Certainly the defence is not likely to produce a spurt of investigative 
journalism. But that is not its purpose. Its purpose is to encourage the 
media not to hesitate to publish all material of public concern which 
they reasonably believe to be accurate. 
Others believe that the McKay defence is so hedged about with 
safeguards that it will be of little use in practice but do not actually 
oppose its enactment. 123 They say it will be almost impossible to reach 
agreement on the wording of the right of reply and that it will be 
difficult to establish that reasonable care has been taken, particularly as 
journalists are likely to refuse to disclose the sources of their 
information. 
In answer to the first concern, the McKay Committee recommended 
that parties should be encouraged to refer any such disagreements to an 
independent third party and that such an offer made by the defendant 
would provide evidence of the reasonableness of the statement.124 As 
for the second concern, it is certainly true that the courts' interpretation 
of the reasonableness requirement will be crucial to the efficacy of the 
defence. Leigh Hodgson worries that it will be easy for the plaintiff to 
point to avenues which ought to have been checked out before 
publication. 
It is also true that journalists might on occasions be reluctant to disclose 
their sources. The McKay Committee realised as much. Yet it still felt 
that the defence would be of use to the media. "In most cases," it 
thought, "the initial source merely alerts the journalist to as matter 
which he then follows up elsewhere and the defence would then be 
available without any need to rely on the initial information."125 It is 
also possible that the source may subsequently go "on the record" so 
that the problem dissolves. It is significant that three members of the 
Committee were directly involved in the media in New Zealand, and 
that the defence has generally been supported by other sectors of the 
media.126 
Professor Burrows recognises these problems but he makes a different 
point. Whatever the practical difficulties with the defence, he says, its 
potential impact on the whole complexion of defamation law should not 
be underestimated. Its liberalising effect could have an influence over 
close decisions in other areas such as the circumstances in which 
qualified privilege may be granted at common law. He concludes: 127 
122 Indeed, it may provide the only feasible remedy for an impecunious plaintiff. 
123 For example, Hodgson, above n 69 and T Goddard Submissions on the Defamation 
Bill 1988 JL/89/446 18. 
124 Above n 13, para 266. 
125 Above n 13, para 249. 
126 See especially the Joint Media Submission to the Select Committee, above n 59, 
para 8. 
127 The Defamation Bill 1988 Submission to the Select Committee, JL/89/443 16, 5. 
Often the spirit of such a change is as important as the letter: it can change the 
climate of the law and I believe the climate of the law of defamation badly 
needs to be changed. 
Suggested Improvements to the Defence 
There are others who argue that the defence does not go far enough.128 
One criticism is that the defence should not be restricted to "matter 
published in a news medium." The principle of free political speech 
offers support to those who believe that the defence should be extended. 
Although I have argued that the media occupies a special position in a 
democratic society in that it they are responsible for meeting our right 
to be informed and act a a check on the operation of government, many 
of the arguments for freeing up political speech apply equally to the 
speech of private persons. The benefits of robust debate with respect to 
the operation of democracy and the discovery of "truth", the public's 
expectation of and need for wide open discussion and criticism, and our 
international human rights obligations all justify protecting the political 
speech of workmates in a public bar as well as that of political 
columnists in a newspaper. 
The Committee gives two reasons for limiting the availability of the 
defence to the news media. One is that "[t]he subject matter of a private 
slander will seldom be of public interest." No doubt this will be of 
great consolation to the 'rare' non-media defendant who does speak out 
on matters of public interest. But are such persons really so rare? It 
should be remembered that all those who publish a defamatory 
statement are liable for it - including of course the original maker of a 
statement subsequently picked up by the media. The maker may have 
taken all reasonable care in relation to the statement. The news 
organisation may simply have ascertained that the maker took that care. 
Why should the media be able to rely on the maker's care when the 
maker himself or herself cannot? A similar argument applies when the 
media is not involved at all. 
The second reason given by the Committee for the limitation of the 
defence to the media is that it will often be impossible for private 
defendants to publish a reply by the defamed person. It is submitted 
that this is to ignore the opportunities that often exist for private persons 
to correct defamatory statements. If the defamation occurs within an 
organisation or society, for example, a right of reply might be given in a 
newsletter or internal memo. Alternatively, a private person could meet 
the costs of the publication of a right of reply in a local newspaper. 
Another option is simply not to apply the right-of-reply requirement to 
non-media defendants at all. After all, their audience is likely to be 
much smaller. 
The point to underscore is that we ought to think carefully before we 
deny to particular people who have taken care with their facts and are 
speaking about matters of public concern a defence that is available to 
128 See, for example, Burrows, above n 127; McKay, above n 10; B Atkin Submission 
to the Justice and Law Refonn Committee on the Defamation Bill 1988 JL/89/437 11. 
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the media in similar circumstances, simply because they might lack the 
ability to offer a right of reply. 
A second criticism of the proposed defence is that it can be defeated by 
malice. Even if the term "malice" is replaced by a test of "improper 
motivation" as recommended by the Committee129 so that it is less 
confusing to the jury, the fact remains that a person who can meet all 
the requirements of the defence may nevertheless lose its protection 
simply because of his or her personal reasons for publishing the 
statement. It is submitted that, from a public point of view, no 
statement which is on a matter of public interest and is honestly and 
reasonably believed by its maker can be regarded as having an improper 
purpose. We ought not to discourage any such statements regardless of 
the publisher's motivation. To do so would be to deny the public 
information which is by definition valuable. It is anachronistic and 
contrary to principle to punish a person for her or his improper motives 
whose actions would otherwise be lawful. The Committee 
recommended that malice be moulded into an honesty requirement with 
respect to fair comment. There is already an honesty requirement in 
this defence. That should be sufficient to deter malice of any flavour 
which is publicly significant. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion It IS submitted that a new defence along the lines 
suggested by the McKay Committee would help redress the imbalance 
of the law and reduce its inhibitory effects on political speech. So, for 
example, a reporter who has discovered the making of huge secret 
payments by businessmen to political leaders, is sure of those facts, and 
wishes to point out in strong terms that such practices are improper 
could, if the defence was enacted, make such allegations with a great 
deal more confidence than at present that whopping defamation writs 
would not ensue. As things turned out, even if the defence was enacted 
it may well not be available to TVNZ in the Frontline case. But 
perhaps that is an indication of its strength. Such a defence would be 
tolerably certain, workable and fair to those whose reputations had been 
falsely impugned. 
Certainly the scope of the defence is wider than the justification 
advanced in this paper. Nonetheless, the reasons put forward in support 
of the protection of political speech highlight the need for such a 
reform. They also suggest that the McKay defence should be modified 
a little. It should be expanded to cover everyone stating facts and 
making comments on matters of public interest and 'malice' on the part 
of the publisher should not defeat the defence. 
The Committee records that it spent much of its time discussing and 
formulating this defence. l30 It was the central plank in its raft of 
recommended reforms. However, the politicians were always likely to 
be less enthusiastic about the idea. There was much interest in whether 
129 Above n 13, para 269-279; see also Defamation Bill 1988 cl 12. 
130 Above n 13, para 234. 
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Professor Geoffrey Palmer, a member of the Committee and later 
Minister of Justice and then Prime Minister, would be able to persuade 
his colleagues in the Labour government to accept the Committee's 
recommendations. 
PART 6. THE DEFAMATION BILL 
In August 1988, more than ten years after the release of the McKay 
Report, the Defamation Bill was introduced to the House. Justice 
Minister the Hon Geoffrey Palmer said that the Bill set out to clarify 
and simplify the law of defamation and was in large part based on the 
recommendations of the McKay Committee.131 However, it stopped 
short of including the special qualified privilege defence for the media. 
Nevertheless, Eden MP Richard Northey called it, without further 
explanation, "an important constitutional advance."132 
The Bill was referred to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee 
for consideration and the hearing of submissions. A number of nunor 
changes resulted. The Bill was reported back to the House in Ocmber' 
1989. Although the principle of free political speech was not discussed 
(except in very general terms) before Parliament or the Select 
Committee, the Bill contains a series of reforms which would be of 
some benefit to those commenting on the character and conduet of 
public officials. The most important of these (in the context of this 
paper) are: 
(i) the reform of the defence of justification ("truth"); 
(ii) the reform of the defence of fair comment ("honest opinion"); 
(iii) the measures dealing with gagging writs; 
(iv) the creation of new remedies; and 
(v) the provision for judicial conferences. 
These will be dealt with in turn. 
(i) The Reform of the Defence of Justification ("Truth") 
Under the Bill, a defendant alleging truth would be entitled to allege 
and prove the truth of any of the imputations contained in the 
publication, and that the publication taken as a whole was substantially 
true.133 This will mean that plaintiffs will not be able to snatch 
snippets of speech out of their context and sue on them alone.134 The 
latitude that this change should provide for the wording of speeches and 
articles - as long as they are not materially false - is particularly 
important in the political context where politicians tend to be sensitive 
to minor errors and quick to sue and where the discouragement of the 
articulation of any perspectives of "truth" has its highest social cost. 
131 NZPD vol 491, 1988: 6369. 
132 Above n 131, 6374. 
133 Cl 8(2) and 8(3). 
134 However, as Professor Burrows points out, the Bill does not clearly allow the 
defendant to plead and prove a meaning different to that alleged by the plaintiff: above 
n 38,106. 
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(ii) The Reform of the Defence of Fair Comment ( "Honest Opinion") 
The Bill replaces the common law concept of malice with a requirement 
that the defendant prove that the opinion was genuine, or, where it is 
made by somebody else but not adopted by the defendant, that it was 
the genuine opinion of the author (in the case of employees and agents) 
or that the defendant had no reasonable cause to believe it was not the 
opinion of the author (in the case of such people as authors of letters to 
the editor and participants in talk-back shows).135 Insofar as it replaces 
the confusing and irrelevant concept of malice it is submitted that the 
proposed reform improves the law by destroying another brick in the 
legal wall that surrounds free speech. 
The honest opinion reforms would also eliminate two other bricks: the 
one which compels a defendant to prove that the comment related to 
facts referred to in the publication (the Bill would permit the proof of 
other foundation facts if they were generally known at the time of 
publication136) and the one which requires a defendant who imputes 
corrupt or dishonourable motives to a person to demonstrate that the 
allegations were warranted (this special rule would be abolishedl37). 
These are significant reforms. They would iron out unjust technicalities 
and make the law better reflect the expectations and practices of 
society. The second reform, especially, receives strong support from 
the arguments made in this paper. It has been demonstrated how 
difficult it can be to avoid impugning the integrity of politicians or other 
public officials when criticising their performance, their policies and the 
ethical rigour of their conduct. In view of the supreme importance of 
the quality of our leaders, such speech should be given special 
protection not special restraint! 
(iii) Measures Dealing with Gagging Writs 
The Bill contains several provisions aimed at controlling the issue and 
efficacy of gagging writs. Under clause 33 the plaintiff's statement of 
claim cannot specify the amount of damages sought in proceedings for 
defamation against a news media defendant. If the judge feels that the 
damages claimed at trial are grossly excessive and the jury awards less, 
the court is to award costs to the defendant. 138 Clause 39 permits the 
135 Cl 9A There seems to be an alanning gap in this provision. It appears that the 
defence of honest opinion will fail if the opinion was written by an employee or agent 
but "purports to be the opinion of the defendant" (cl 9A(2)(a)(i)). Editorials fall into 
exactly this category. Editorially slanted features may do as well . Editorials are the 
very epitome of the sort of speech that a defence of fair comment is designed to protect. 
Are they to receive no protection at all?! Another difficulty involves the interpretation 
of the "genuine opinion" requirement. Why must the opinion be "genuine" rather than 
"honest" as the new title of the defence would suggest? Is there a difference? Must the 
defendant show that the opinion was actually held, or merely that it was one that an 
honest person might hold? 
136 Cl 9B 
137 Cl 9C 
13g Cl 33(2). 
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defendant to apply for the proceedings to be struck out (so that they 
cannot be reinstated without leave) for want of prosecution if no date 
has been fixed for trial and no other action has been taken for the 
preceding 12 months. Further, clause 34 deems proceedings vexatious 
if they are commenced with no intention of proceeding to trial. 
All of these measures are open to objection. Will the defendant's fright 
at receiving a writ be substantially less simply because damages are not 
specified? Why should a successful plaintiff ever have to pay the 
defendant's costs? Will the potential for proceedings to be struck out 
have any deterrent effect on the issue of gagging writs when they were 
never intended to be pursued? How could such an intention be proved 
for the purposes of clause 34? 
It is submitted, however, that the Bill makes the best fist of a very 
difficult problem. The provisions at least have educative value and at 
best may deter a pernicious practice which can stifle debate on issues of 
great public moment. 
(iv) The Creation of New Remedies 
The Bill contains three new remedies. 
First, the defamed person may seek a retraction or reply. If this is 
granted by the publisher with reasonable promptness and prominence 
and the publisher meets the requester's costs, including economic loss 
caused to the requester by the statement, the publisher's actions are 
taken into account in mitigation of damages. 139 Quite apart from the 
interpretative difficulties thrown up by this provision (what is a 
"reasonable reply"?; what is covered by the term "pecuniary loss"?), 
this clause is unlikely to be utilised often. The publisher will usually be 
able to negotiate a better settlement than the clause envisages - and 
thereby make the whole problem go away.140 
Second, the plaintiff may seek a simple declaration that the defendant is 
liable for defamation. If this is the sole remedy sought and the claim is 
successful, the plaintiff will normally be awarded costs.141 
Third, the plaintiff can seek a judicial correction order. The award of 
costs is again used as an incentive to encourage plaintiffs to seek this 
remedy alone. If a plaintiff chooses to seek a correction order, special 
damages (that is, economic loss) are still recoverable. General damages 
are not. The judge may give directions as to the form and content of the 
correction but must have regard to the defendant's interest in 
maintaining the style and character of the publication. 
Needless to say the media are not overly enamoured with this provision. 
They argue that it violates their right to decide what not to publish and 
139 Cls 18 and 21. 
140 Burrows, above n 38, 54. 
141 Cl 17. Damages may be sought as well, but the grant of a declaration will be taken 
into account when the sum is determined: cl 21. 
38 
sets a dangerous precedent for further inroads into the independence of 
the media. Furthermore, there are technical problems with its 
application. 142 
Despite these difficulties, it is submitted that the public's right to be 
informed justifies the availability of correction orders. They facilitate 
informed choice. If an independent fact-finding tribunal concludes that 
a news organisation has erred it would seem odd for the organisation to 
argue that the public interest is advanced by its refusal to publicly 
acknowledge that finding . They cannot be directed to print apologies 
or retractions as such. The limits of the remedy are circumscribed 
closely enough to allay concerns that this may be the 'thin end of the 
wedge'. 
Further, the non-availability of general damages when a correction 
order is sought ought, if this remedy is used often enough, to reduce the 
financial deterrent to the publication of stories whose facts are believed 
true but may be difficult to prove in court.143 
(v) Provision for Judicial Conferences 
The Bill would empower judge to call a conference with or without an 
application by one of the parties. At the conference the judge may try 
to resolve particular issues between the parties, make a correction order 
with their consent, elicit admissions of fact, make orders relating to 
discovery and interrogatories and expedite the proceedings by fixing 
dates for the filing of documents or the taking of other such steps. 
To the extent that Judicial conferences succeed in encouraging 
settlement, speeding up the judicial process and narrowing the issues at 
trial, they should lead to a welcome reduction in the costs of defamation 
actions and a corresponding warming of the journalistic climate. 
142 That is, because it comes at the end of a trial it is unlikely to be speedy; it is only 
really appropriate for statements that are demonstrably untrue; the burden of proof 
should not lie with the defendant; and problems may arise where the defendant is an 
individual whose statements are reported through the media: see Burrows, above n 38, 
52-54. 
143 Correction orders are central to the Australian Law Reform Commission's 
recommendations for the reform of defamation law. The Commission received 
overwhelming support for the proposal, which was "accepted as fair and workable by 
all the major media interests in Australia" (above n 11, para 258). It reasoned that 
correction orders strike a better balance between speech and reputation by creating a 
middle ground to replace the former 'damages or nothing' approach (paras 257, 277-
278). 
It also emphasised the need for speed and recommended that defamation cases be given 
priority in the courts. Quick judicial consideration of these issues should also deter 
gagging writs because "[t]here would be little point in an action in which bluff is liable 
to be called so quickly" (para 258). Applications for correction orders in New Zealand 
are given no such priority. Given the special nature of such a correction remedy whose 
efficacy depends on its ability to "catch up" with the original libel and given the public 
interest in having both sides of public issues presented relatively contemporaneously, 
perhaps we too should give consideration to expediting such claims. 
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Other Changes 
There are many other measures in the Bill that will help to simplify, 
clarify and improve the law and its procedures. These include the 
abolition of criminal libel, 144 the extension of the categories of 
statutory qualified privilege, 145 the replacement of malice with a 
codification entitled "rebuttal of qualified privilege",146 and the 
direction to judges to make their rulings on the question of whether the 
words complained of are capable of being defamatory in the absence of 
the jury .147 
Omissions from the Bill 
There is much that is useful in the Bill. But that does not make it a 
"major constitutional advance". In fact, the Bill is more notable for 
what it does not achieve than what it does. It does not, for example, 
tighten up the availability of interim injunctions and insist on a hearing 
for the defendant before they are issued; it does not curtail (or abolish) 
the role of juries or even set a ceiling on the level of damages; and it 
does not reenact the defence of unintentional defamation148 which, 
although little used in court, may well be affecting the outcomes of out-
of-court settlements. 
More importantly, the Bill does not include the one reform which would 
have really altered the balance of New Zealand's law in favour of the 
right to speak and the right to receive information: the McKay 
Committee's defence of qualified privilege. Introducing the Bill to 
Parliament, the Hon Geoffrey Palmer confided that he knew "of few 
subjects that excite more passionate concern among members of 
Parliament" than the law of defamation.149 Indeed it has often been 
suggested, several times by Professor Palmer himself, that politicians 
have a vested interest in keeping defamation laws exactly as they 
are.150 So it is disappointing, but not surprising, that they have 
"gutted" 151 the package of reforms recommended by the McKay 
Committee. 
144 Defamation Bill 1988, Cl 47(2). 
145 First Schedule, Part II, cls 5, 9, 10. 
146 Cl 12. 
147 Cl 27. One wonders why the Bill does not apply this rule to tbe judges' 
preliminary determinations on malice and fair comment as well. 
148 Above n 27. 
149 Above n 131. 
150 G Palmer "Politics and Defamation" Address to Auckland District Law Society 
'Waitangi' Seminar 14 June 1980. 
151 Rotorua MP Paul East NZPD vol 502, 1989: 12898. Paul East's speech was a 
remarlcable one. At first be seemed to chastise the government for "gutting" the "far 
reaching" and "major" reforms proposed by the McKay Committee. He went on to 
outline the terms of the defence and presented a fair case for its enactment. He 
concluded, however, that it was "not warranted' because it would make our law too 
much like that of the US. His coup de grace was that American public figures who are 
unfairly defamed "would wish to have a place in the laws we have in New Z.ealand." 
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The reasons given in Parliament for the scrapping of the defence were 
diverse and, with respect, unconvincing. Many of the arguments 
discussed in Part 5 were raised again in the House.152 Particular weight 
was placed on the argument that "there is no justification for according 
the news media special privileges that are not enjoyed by ordinary 
citizens" 153 though the prospect of extending the defence to everybody 
was not discussed. It was also stressed that the defence would be 
unworkable as journalists would refuse to disclose their sources.154 As 
has already been pointed out, the media themselves believe 
otherwise. 155 The MPs' argument is infuriatingly paternalistic - it is 
like denying a child an ice cream on the grounds that she will not eat all 
of it! 
Having listened to these arguments the hon Richard Prebble and the hon 
Bill Jeffries both maintained that truth Uustification) alone is a 
sufficient defence for the media. It seems that the same reporters who 
would be loathe to reveal their sources to prove that they had taken 
reasonable care with their facts, are perfectly willing to do so when the 
issue involved is one of truth! Furthermore, if truth is indeed the 
"100% defence" and the media do not deserve any special protection 
unavailable to other members of society, why should the position of 
MPs in the House be any different? 
A further argument against the defence was that "the news media . 
environment has changed dramatically since 1977")56 That is 
certainly true. Some of the changes have already been outlined in thi s 
He ignored the huge differences between the proposed defence and the United States' 
public figure rule. Not only is the standard of care expected of plaintiffs higher under 
the Committee's defence, but the burden of proof rests with the defendant who is also 
required to offer the defamed person a right of reply. 
As for bis other point, it cannot be doubted that plaintiffs can recover more easily under 
the laws of New Zealand than under those of the US. In fact this would be so even if 
the McKay defence were enacted. But bis argument does not actually take us 
anywhere. Is it supposed to be self-evident that the rule which most benefits politicians 
and other public figures is for that reason alone best for society as a whole? 
152 The government felt that "there was no pressing need to change the existing 
balance between freedom of speech and the protection of reputation." (Palmer, above n 
131). The bon Richard Prebble was loathe to give the media licence "to publish lies 
about people in public office with impunity" (above n 151, 12899). He also asserted 
that the present laws do not inhibit public debate. I need not canvas the replies to these 
arguments again in any detail. Suffice to repeat that I believe that our defamation laws 
do inhibit speech, that a society which valued the free political speech principle more 
highly would strike a different legal balance and that the McKay defence contains 
sufficient safeguards against abuse. 
153 Remuera MP Doug Graham, above n 151, 12896; see also Glenfield MP Judy 
Keall 's speech at p 12897. 
154 See, for exan1ple, Eden MP Richard Northey's speech, above n 151, 12895. 
155 Above Part 5. 
156 Above n 131. Admittedly Professor Palmer is not the best person to put these 
arguments as he supports much more radical reform. (See G Palmer "Defamation - An 
Overview" in Media Law (Legal Research Foundation, 1988), 7, 14. 
4 1 
paper. 157 There is a much greater volume of material being distributed 
these days and consequently an increased likelihood that defamatory 
statements will be made. There is also a greater demand for news and 
discussion of public affairs, the media are more competitive and there is 
less opportunity to check stories as they are being released. These 
factors point to the need for tight control over the media. They also 
point to the need for laws which recognise the constraints on the media 
and the importance of their role. At best the arguments are about 
evenly balanced. The McKay defence would seem to be a fair 
compromise. 
In conclusion, the Defamation Bill does not go as far as it might in 
fostering free speech in New Zealand. The law is still weighted against 
defendants. However, even if the balance has not been redressed, at 
least the Bill tries to repair the scales. 
The Bill has not yet been passed. The government that sponsored it is 
out of office. Given the reluctance of MPs to tamper with their "lump-
sum form of superannuation"158 it may be a long time before it again 
sees the legislative light of day. 
PART 7. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
We are left with the imponderable: the effect of the Bill of Rights. It 
has already been suggested that the Bill might be used as a source of 
principle for the development of the common law.159 It may have a 
much bigger impact than that, depending on the answer to a number of 
questions. Does the Bill apply to private legal relations?160 Are the 
constraints on free expression imposed by New Zealand's defamation 
laws "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"?161 
The courts are very likely to refer to the jurisprudence on other 
constitutional and human rights documents when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. An analysis of all the possibilities is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the discussion on our international obligations under the 
Covenant may well be of relevance, particularly as the long title of the 
Bill of Rights states that it was designed "to affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights". 
157 Above Part 3C. 
158 Above n 150, 9. 
159 In connection with the common law defence of qualified privilege, above n 46. 
160 Andrew Butler has argued that it does. He contends that"common law rules which 
are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights can and should be set aside" ("The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights and Private Litigation" [1991) NZU 261, 262. However, he considers 
that most of the common law already meets the standards set out in the Bill (p262). 
Might this be one of the small class of cases where it does not? (But see P Rishworth 
"The Potential of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" [1990] NZIJ 68, and D Paciocco 
"The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a Debilitated Bill" [1990) 
NZ Recent Law Review 353, where it is argued that the Bill of Rights does not apply to 
private litigation.) 
161 Bill of Rights Act 1990 s5. 
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If the courts agree that "the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as 
regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual",162
 
then what? The Bill might be construed to require the plaintiff to prove 
some element of fault in the political context, or permit a no-fault 
defence. It is even conceivable that the New Zealand courts will follow 
the United States approach and require that particular plaintiffs prove 
constitutional malice. It is submitted that the most likely and desirable 
outcome would be the development of a defence of reasonable care 
along the lines of that proposed in this paper. 
These are open questions. It is up to the judges. The Bill is in their 
courts. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the law of defamation in New Zealand in 
connection with political speech. Can we really "say what we like"? It 
seems that freedom of speech in New Zealand consists of the right to 
say things that can be proved in court a couple of years later; to 
comment on matters of public concern - with carefully chosen words 
based on provable and earlier-stated facts - in circumstances where 
there is no ill-will for a jury to seize on and label 'malice'; to act as a 
conduit for various (mostly official) channels of infomiation; and to 
speak to certain restricted audiences on ill-defined occasions when there 
can be said to be a duty to speak or an interest to protect. 
Thus in the ocean of political free expression there is an island of 
legally allowable speech. But it is not safe to wander everywhere on 
the island. The unpredictable tides of the juries' application of the law 
mean that it is best to stay beyond the high tide mark. Even then, fears 
of storms of political backlash may tempt us to remain on the very 
upper reaches of the island. And dark threatening rainclouds may send 
us shinnying up trees. As a result, large parts of the island (not to 
mention the ocean) remain unexplored. 
Bravely, or perhaps foolishly, the Frontline crew paddled in the ocean 
of unprotected speech. They raised issues of political and constitutional 
significance and received five massive defamation writs for their 
trouble. Now all of the other editors and journalists in New Zealand are 
watching from the high ground to see whether TVNZ drowns! 
I have argued that the chill which surrounds political speech in New 
Zealand is unhealthy. As the European Court has recognised political 
speech is of a different character to other types of speech. It is the only 
way we can learn about, and exercise effective control over, the 
officials to whom we delegate sovereign power. It is particularly 
important in modem day New Zealand because public officials' policies 
are having an enormous impact on the lives of New Zealanders, while 
at the same time there is a growing frustration at our powerless with 
I 
162 Lingens case, above n 82. 
respect to public officials who often break promises and are not seen to 
be responding to the needs of the people. 
Nor are our international obligations, the needs of 'truth' and public 
expectations of the right to speak served by defamation laws that are 
murky, beset with technicalities, plaintiff-biased and which take no 
account of the amount of care taken be the defendant and insufficient 
account of the importance of the position of political plaintiffs. In 
short, some extra land needs to be reclaimed for our island of allowable 
political speech. 
This can be achieved in a number of different ways. We need not go as 
far as the Americans who seem to have reclaimed most of the ocean in 
the name of free speech! Our own McKay Committee has 
recommended a more limited defence which would redress the 
imbalance in our law without unduly prejudicing plaintiffs. Sadly, our 
politicians have not seen fit to implement the recommendation. Their 
motives must be suspect. It will be surprising if even the watered down 
Defamation Bill is passed in the near future. 
The Bill of Rights offers a glimmer of hope for what would be radical 
change. As things stand, however, I have grave doubts about whether 
New Zealand's defamation laws are "for the public good". 
As a coda, I would make one other point. If any of these changes do 
eventuate, it will be news organisations which benefit most. If the legal 
constraints on political speech are relaxed there will undoubtedly be 
increased opportunity for the abuse of the power of the media. 
Thought should be given to the development of more appropriate 
mechanisms for the control of journalists and the protection of the 
privacy and reputation of people in the public eye. 
Ideally, media organisations themselves, including newspapers, should 
be encouraged to develop better methods for investigating complaints 
and controlling standards and systems of internal discipline. Perhaps 
there should be a statutory Standards Authority with jurisdiction over 
written publications to complement the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority. Alternatively we could establish a media ombudsman or a 
Press Commission with power to investigate complaints and order 
rights of reply. It may be that some of the solution lies in improving the 
training and sense of professional responsibility of our journalists and, 
particularly in connection with the issue of gagging writs and 
applications for interim injunctions , perhaps our lawyers as well! 
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